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Graduate research study dissertation in botany msn nursing capstone ideas for money housekeeping cover letter no experience sample - I now have the great pleasure of handing the baton to the President of City College, who is going to be our next speaker and this Rifkind Center symposium on New Normal, Presidential Politics and the University, 2017. Vince Boudreau is our President from City College. (audience clapping) - Thank you, calling me the next speaker maybe elevates what I planned to do. I made the intent to welcome you and to say how pleased I am and grateful that, for Charlie and Helen for organizing this and for our speakers for being here today. But I do want to say something a little bit about the role of the university at this moment. As I see it, all universities share some obligation. Public universities have some particular obligations. And again, I think particularly in this moment, we have these obligations. All of us take students in every year and we have an obligation to our students, we have an obligation to the people who send the students here, families and friends, to educate them and to take care of them in some ways. And again, in this moment, the obligations that we have to take care of the whole people, all of our students are particularly sharp. You may or may not know of the 109 students at CUNY who are affected by the travel ban. 66 of them are City College students. So this is absolutely a City College problem. But if you follow the news, even a little bit, you know that students from these seven countries is really just the tip of the iceberg. News came across today of Professor Cotton who is the father of the slain soldier and a citizen for 30 years is having his travel papers reviewed. To think that on those campus who are in danger are confined to 66 students from these seven countries, is naive and incorrect. We have, first of all, an obligation to protect those students. The second thing is we have an obligation to the scientists and scholars working here to support the work that they do. That's a public investment, but more importantly even than that is we have an obligation to communicate what goes on in this university. A public university has to be public in its sense of communicating usable, useful research to a community. And this is important now because the very foundations of knowledge, the very faith that we have as a people in data, investigation, is being undercut every single day. It has been a tradition of long standing that the State Department brief the President every single day. And there's not been one State Department briefing since this President came into office. There is a long standing tradition of policy about the environment being based on science. And we have put in place in that agency someone who's very ambitions for the position of the Environmental Protection Agency is to eradicate it. And you can go down the line where, it's not just policies that we disagree with, but an approach to policy making, an approach to public discourse, which is, you can only say antithetical to the very foundations of the institution that we're in right now. And so I think our speakers will have particular things to say about this. But what I'd like to say is that I'm proud that in this moment that we come together, not just as scholars, not just as students, not just as people who are interested in these, but as the embodiment of this historic institution. And because we are a historic institution, in some ways the embodiment of the whole ideal of public education, the idea that we are, as a society, are better off if we invest in the education of the whole people. And this is not just for the benefit of the students who pass through these doors and the families and the children that will benefit from their education. It's because if we invest in the education of the whole people, we invest in the basic faith that knowledge and facts and science matter. It should matter in the formation of a public policy. This is, I think, today, we're gathered here in some fundamental way to reiterate our mission statement. So I'm pleased that I have you here as an audience. I'm grateful, as I said, to the organizers of this. And so happy that we have these three distinguished guests to speak on this quorum, so thank you all. (audience clapping) - Good Morning. Hi, I'm Mikhail Dekel, I'm the Director of the Rifkind Center for the Humanities and the Arts here at City College. So this event started as a conversation between me and my colleague. We were thinking like what is role of the university in the current political climate? An obvious answer is that university seeks truth in a post-truth era. But that's a little bit of a sound byte answer, because we know that proof in the university and elsewhere is debated, contested, by individuals, by groups and by nations. And in fact, if we think of given truth has part and parcel of the humanities and the social sciences, at least since the 1960s. So I was thinking that perhaps one place where the university can start is not with the affirmation of truth, but with the affirmation of a common destiny. And by common destiny, I don't mean it in the kind of make America great again, fake nationalistic way, but, in thinking about the ways in which we are all in this moment together in some way. Recognizing differences, recognizing equalities, but also recognizing that we're all in this together. And let me see if I can. I saw this, so the philosopher Rosi Braidotti has this in her book and she said something that I thought was very appropriate for this moment. "We're all in this together, but we are not one." And I think that's a very good way of capturing this moment. We are all in this together, humans, animals, Leonardo da Vinci's dog, we are environmental activists, climate change deniers, citizens, immigrants, we are all affected. Citizens and immigrants, not only immigrants are affected by what is happening, but also citizens. They're not affected equally, but there are affected. I think that's one place where we can start thinking about these things. The second area where I think the university might intervene in the current political moment is to facilitate, encourage and propagate research based debate. And it's actually astounding how much conservative critique and anger, really, has been waged at the liberal universities. The university figure is in the imagination of the right-wing in a very big way, and I'll just read you very quickly a few pieces by New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd. Maureen Dowd, on Thanksgiving, two weeks or so after the elections, goes to her brother's home for Thanksgiving and her brother Kevin, whom she describes as, I'm quoting, an outgoing, educated suburbanite, who has what he calls Election Therapy Guide for Liberals. So she goes to see her brother and this is the first thing she, on the Thanksgiving table, is Trump champagne alongside a turkey. So her family is celebrating while she is very upset. And this is the message that Kevin Dowd has for liberal readers and their kind, who says, "The election was a complete repudiation "of Barack Obama, his fantasy world "of political correctness." The political correctness, a term that's kind of taken from academia. "The politicization of the Justice Department "and the IRS, an out-of-control EPA," and yes, something that we talk about, "his neutering of the military, "his nonsupport of the police and his fixation "on things like transgender bathrooms." Which again, things that came out of gender studies and academia in general. "Preaching and pandering with a message of inclusion, "the Democrats have instead become a party where incivility "and bad manners are taken for granted, rudeness is routine, "religion is mocked and there is absolutely no respect "for a differing opinion." And again, Democrats, at least universities, liberal arts universities and so on. "Here is a short primer for the young protesters," of Trump's victory, "if your preferred candidate loses, "there is no need for mass hysteria, canceled midterms," and again, as if all trans voters are college students. "Safe spaces, crying rooms or group primal screams. "Not one of the 50 colleges mandate "one semester of Western Civilization. "Maybe they should rethink that." So all of this anger at the university, so where do we go from here? Does the university defend its former practices? Does it look for new practices? How does it deal, I think, with the real, I think, rage and tone of revenge that seems beneath these ironic words. So these are some of the things that I would like to open up here, directly or indirectly, and hopefully in a series of conversations that will happen throughout the semester and the next semester and so on, as needed. So the format of today will be each speaker will speak for about 20 minutes, 15, 20 minutes, then there'll be 15, 20 minute Q&A. Then a little break, there's food outside, there are bathrooms, there's water, and then we'll come back for the next speaker. There'll be five speakers. And we're going to start, actually sorry, get my notes. We are going to start with our first speaker, Dr. Judith Stein, who is an Emerita Distinguished Professor of American History here at City College and at the CUNY Graduate Center. Professor Stein works on African American history, social movements, labor and business history, and political economy. She has written for the New York Times, for Dissent, Village Voice, The Nation and her last book, I believe, is called Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance. - Thank you, okay. In an election that had many historic features, it spawned a lot of exotic explanations. I'm going to take completely a different approach. I think Trumpstickery was embedded in the history of the last 40 or 50 years. And can be explained and needs to be explained if anyone is to formulate an opposition. After I do that briefly, I'm going to talk about three things. One, what the numbers tell us about its meaning, second, what the contradictions are within what I call the Trump GOP coalition, because I think there are two formations here. And finally, what the assumptions of the opposition strategies, of which there are two, what these assumptions are. Which will help us choose which one is better. If you want to place on situation, in the broadest context, the Trump victory is part of the worldwide protest against globalization, with American characteristics. That story has long and deep roots in the United States, even though the world globalization is quite recent. When Trump told Americans last week that he was President of the U.S. and not the globe, he was critiquing past policy. Now, when I use the word critique with Trump, I don't mean an academic critique, I don't even mean a politician critique. What I do mean is, Trump, and I know this is a pejorative, and I don't mean it as such, but I think he is a demagogue. And it was important to remember about demagogues, is they put their finger on real problems, but their solutions are often bogus. So an argument is, he has put his finger on the wrong, excuse me, on a problem which has been ignored, but his solutions are bogus. Now what do I mean by this? On the one hand, he will criticize globalism, and on the other hand, he will ask for a huge increase in the military. That is a contradiction. But of course, he's not a systematic thinker. Okay, so this where I'm going. Let me briefly summarize why I think he has a point here. After World War II, both parties granted Cold War allies access to the huge American market, even if it meant harming specific industries and permitted discrimination against American exporters to so cement these Cold War alliances. The U.S. was a global power. George Ball, President Kennedy's Under Secretary of State said quote, "we Americans can afford to pay "some economic price for a strong Europe." Providing Japan access to the U.S. market during the same period, when Europe mostly banned its products was similar. American elites believed that without access to the American market, Japan would turn to China or the Soviet Union. Initially, because the U.S. was so much richer than Europe and Japan, it did not seem there would be a great price for this. But as Europe and Japan recovered and as oil became more expensive in the 1970s, such global priorities became costly. Nonetheless, the policy was maintained and expanded. In 1977, Jimmy Carter said, quote, "Free access to U.S. markets is a matter of ranking "importance for our allies and almost all "the developing countries of the world." His NSC head added that for the sake of the global order, we must be prepared to undertake and court necessary sacrifice. Even after the Cold War ended, Germany's president told President George Bush in 1992, "The size and strength "of the American market is of vital importance "to the rest of the world, leading with us." This is the factual basis for Trump's critique. Then, beginning with the NAFTA, in 1993, the American government went a step further by making it easy for corporations to offshore jobs to a developing country to reduce labor costs and enhance profits. This was to be a solution to America's competitive problem, which Reagan changes had not solved. Again, there was an opposition, a majority of Democrats opposed Bill Clinton's NAFTA. Still, neither the old nor new dissent reached presidential campaigns until this year. In 2016, for the first time in U.S. history, two insurgents challenged bipartisan global investment and trade policy. Bernie Sanders on the left and Donald Trump from the right. You might ask, why now? And why in both courts? The insurgencies were propelled by the Great Recession. Which offered tempting targets, especially the banks and the political elites that supported the bailouts. The swift recovery of Wall Street and the stagnation of many main streets, fingered the role of financialization which led to an increasing disconnect between stock market performance and the real economy, with large rewards going to firms that undertook asset stripping, outsourcing and off-shoring. The climination of globalization financialization produced new class of owners and those who service them in global cities and growing insecurity and casualization of employment in the bulk of the middle and working class. Even elites acknowledge the growing inequality. This has been the weakest recovery since World War II. Currently, U.S. growth is sluggish, 1.9% in the last quarter and when stagnation continues despite relatively low unemployment. So why did insurgency win among Republicans and not Democrats? Every election combines heat changes and random contingent events. Initially, it seemed as if Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio, establishment Republicans, would win the primary, which initially had 17 contestants. Donald Trump was such an outlandish, unlikely candidate that his rivals directed their arrows at other competitors. When establishment Republicans recognized the situation, it was just too late. In contrast, the Democratic elite early on rallied around Hillary Clinton and unlike the GOP, the Democratic party had a wall of super delegates to protect her. The Republican party does not have the super delegates. I suspect that they will change the rules for the next time, if Trump screws up. Still, Trump did not win simply because he was lucky. The deep forces of the Great Recession disrupted the GOP coalition to permit his victory. Since the 1960s, the Republican party was basically composed of suburban white middle class small business people, professionals and managers and a minority of older white workers. But Republican economic policy, free trade, deregulation, liberal immigration policy and low-tax policy were mainly determined by the big multinational corporation. The Bush and Obama bailout of the banks damaged this alliance. And the result was the Tea Party. The Tea Party was an alliance of older white suburban small business people, professional and a manager, who railed against what they called corporate welfare. They joined with Libertarian capitalists like the Koch brothers, who saw this as an opportunity to defeat the Affordable Care Act, Obamacare, and privatize Medicare and Social Security. More mainstream capitalists tolerated this as long as the Tea Party targeted unions and social services. This alliance reached its height when Republicans win the House and deprived Democrats of their super majority in the Senate in 2010. They were helped by the 9% unemployment rate, which basically had not budged since Obama took office. Unlike the political establishment, the Tea Party right supported stricter immigration control and wasn't phased by the possibility of federal credit default. In contrast, a large part of corporate America supported immigration and immigration reform. High-tech industries wanted access to skilled foreign professionals and labor intensive sectors, like agriculture and construction, landscaping, domestic service, child care, healthcare and hospitality relied upon low-wage, vulnerable immigrant labor. Both the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, the leading business organizations, opposed deportations. They wanted reform and a guest worker program and some path to legal status. The uneasy alliance between the party, the Tea Party, and traditional elites ended in 2013, over the budget and immigration reform. President Obama had negotiated a grand bargain with the Republicans. Flushed with their victory in 2010, the GOP felt it was strong enough to legislate its agenda and President Obama believed he had to acknowledge the verdict. So Obama agreed to historic cuts in the federal government and social safety net in exchange for increased federal taxation. In the end, Speaker John Boehner withdrew the offer because the Tea Party opposed. - In your talk, you used words like populous demagogue, that was one of the phrases that stuck out. I guess what I'm wondering is what your sense of it? Do we need a new label? - I deliberately try, I couldn't, in that example, avoid using it and I thought many times before using it, in part because it's a pejorative, obviously. And I wanted this to be more analytic. But the other thing is I avoided this because I am sick and tired of hearing from people, "We're a fascist America." So I said, let's not label, first of all, let me put it this way, he's just in office. It's hard to figure out where this is going, but I think the implication of my argument is that those who label him a fascist are wrong. Although it's this particularities, if you look at the program, it is partly mainstream Republicanism, and partly economic nationalism. Maybe that's not a very elegant way of putting it together, but it seems to me that it's not a unique speciousness. We're not in a Trump era, first of all, or we're not in, Trumpism, to me has no meaning. - [Andreas] Okay, so if you suggest that there is an element of mainstream Republicanism and an element of economic nationalism, what about the sort of etho-nationalism. - Yes, both, both, absolutely. He combines both the economic nationalism and nativism, yes, absolutely, absolutely. He incorporates it and of course by incorporating it, he enhances it, absolutely. - [Andreas] Okay, so one further question, then I'll open things up. So then with a lot of attention given to Trump's success and Professor Stein dwells on this in her book, Trump's success in winning over voters formerly in the Democratic camp, including labor union voters, which have traditionally been part of the Democratic constituency. So I guess I'm wondering what your sense is of the future of unions, politically speaking. Where will the key battles be fought around labor? Organization? - Well, right now, there is an important potential strike going on in Mississippi. In a Nissan plant which is 80% black, which Bernie Sanders went to, a few other people went to, this doesn't mean, now why am I talking about this with unions? Because in general, white workers in union are more liberal Democratic than not. So if you have fewer white workers in your union, you have fewer opponents to the Trump vision. But you see, what I would stress is the attraction that these workers had to Trump for talking about jobs. To me, on that issue, it's the Democratic party that's gotta get its act together on the issue. The quote from Chuck Schumer, we don't need these people. The party of Franklin Roosevelt? I mean, come on, you see, that is, and of course, this is what I mean by its closeness to Wall, the party's growing closeness to Wall Street and the financial sector in general. - Okay. - Okay. - [Andreas] So let me open it up. Any questions for Professor Stein? Yes, here? - Professor Stein, thank you, that was a beautiful talk. My question is regarding Trump and his business. - Excuse me, his what? - Trump and his business, as we all know he stepped into office, Trump and his business? - His business. - His, oh his business. - Yes, yes, as we know, he stepped into office and had to relinquish publicly the relationship between him and his business, but I can't imagine, nor have I seen, any stoppage between this. Between your research and findings on the greater political economy in the political realm, have you found anything with any relationship to be had between Trump, his business and integrating into this new global system? This new economic patriotism, they called it, or nationalism? - I'm sure someone must have done research on this. All I know is what you can read in the newspaper. That his hotels are global, or his branding, remember. He doesn't so much now build hotels, but brands them. Are global, and so that may be it runs well. Another kind of contradiction, within his own being. But I don't have anything to add. I am less persuaded that that's the key to understanding Trump than other phenomena. His role is business but I only, he clearly has a penchant for rich businessmen, he likes them. But, more than that, I don't see, the other things is that I think his lack of knowledge of government is partly a function of the fact that he has been a businessman and he really doesn't know the way government functions. Independent of his intentions, it shows a lot of that. But I can't add more to his business dealings. And I sort of don't think that's key to understanding where he's coming from. - I have a couple questions. One is, do you think that the degradation of American public education since 1968 has coincided with these political phenomenon? And coincidentally at the same time, the greater improvement of higher education in this country, and also what your opinion is of the work done by the Berkeley sociologist, I think her name is Arlie Hochschild. - Hochschild. - I don't know her work, sorry. - [Audience Member] She recently did a book about time, about some five years that she spent in Louisiana talking to Trump groups and doing the very thing that you were talking about Democrats not having done for the past several. - Uh-huh, uh-huh. - [Audience Member] But I would ask you to comment. - The implication of both of your question and what I would say is that the notion that Trump voters or Trumpites, are true believers. The little stuff I have heard from people interviewing them, they're much more like transactional voters. Meaning, if he can bring back jobs, I'm all for him, but if he doesn't, there's another guy running next time. So to me, that gives me hope. It's not that they're true believers. Or at least the ones that swung this election. Obviously there are Trump true believers. That's true of any politician. Now your first question on the? - [Audience Member] The decline of public education since 1968. - It certainly didn't help. It can't predict what happens in one year, but if the argument is that these kinds of separation encouraged this kind of behavior, your absolutely right. - [Audience Member] If you're talking about this thing turning around any time soon, how many years they've taken to destroy this institution? - Well, let me put it this way, here is where I don't think there's a new normal. I think we are, I think it depends, a lot, for instance, before I came, this new Republican Obamacare thing. And I read an article that said nobody likes it, even within the Republican party. They won't be able to do this. In other words, so the amount of damage, yes, I don't want underscored, the amount of damage that they can do and the psychic damage that they can do to immigrants and their families. I don't want to underestimate that. But all I mean to say is, it's not so easy to change things in America. The left has often discovered this. And Donald Trump will also. I don't know, I think the next six months will be critical. And this is, how does their healthcare thing go? What happens to tax reform? Or whether infrastructure will ever get done? He's already postponed it a year and that was the issue that supposedly drew these former Democrats and he's postponed it. What's happening on the job front? Is he really going to renegotiate the NAFTA and deal with China? Actually, I hate to say what, I don't know why I say I hate to say, he's got three very good people on the trade issue who know a lot. One of them had worked with Democrats and the AFL-CIO. So it is possible, but as I mentioned, he's got these kind of people, but then he's got Goldman Sachs people. Who is going to win out within? So there are conflicts between the White House and the Republican Congress and within the White House, between what I call the economic nationalists and the Goldman Sachs globalists. I suspect, on this issue, that the Goldman Sachs people are going to win. - They always do. - Well, that's the point. That's the point. At least if the issue is raised. But if they do, then the amount of damage he can do on other issues is going to small. Because he came to power on the basis of an economic nationalist program and he doesn't deliver, well, people are not going to vote for him again. - We have time for one more quick question, (mumbles) - [Audience Member] So you've been mentioning that Donald Trump has sort of got a split between his more working class supporters and his more business and globalism workers, so do you think he's going to one way or another, end up alienating one of those two groups? And if not, which of the two do you think the Democratic party will try to pick up? Because they're going to want to side with either the globalists or the blue collar workers, which one do you think they're going to try to pander to? - Who is they? - The Democratic party. - Well, that depends upon what Democratic, you know if the Sanders forces in the Democratic party are stronger what the choice will be. If the Clintonaughts, they have a record on this issue. They're globalists. The last part of what I said was they argue that they don't need the working class because they can appeal to minorities on the basis of race, which of course the Republicans can't, and that will satisfy the minority. My argument is that that won't. But who's to say? Well, I was right in the last election, but you never know. In the case of Donald Trump, in part because he has never had a history of soliciting working class support, it would lead me to believe that when push came to shove, Goldman Sachs would win, just because there's very little in his record that would, I mean, look, he could prove me wrong. But that's the only basis. He has yielded again and again on these issues. Prescription drugs, he said, "We're going to bargain "the prices down," he yielded when confronted or when surrounded by pharmaceutical executives. So where does that, and that of course is a very popular important issue. - Okay, I'm afraid I hate to stop this line of questions, because I think there's lots more to be said, but we do have to move on. So let's give Professor Stein your applause. (audience clapping) Thank you very much. Professor of American History. He just joined us from Columbia University, where he was a member of the Society of Fellows. He is going to be, this talk is going to be based on his newly published book, Expelling the Poor: Atlantic Seaboard States and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of American Immigration Policy. So Professor Hirota is an expert on anti-immigration sentiment and atheism in America. And he's going to be making connections between that history and contemporary events. This is a book that literally just appeared, I think last month. - Late January. - Late January. (speaker drowned out by camera shutters clicking) So literally hot off the press. (audience clapping) - Hello, I'd like thank Professors Dekel and Killen for inviting me here to this very important event. And of course, I'd like to thank everyone for joining us this evening. I'm a historian of the United States and especially American immigration. And tonight, I want to talk about, I want to discuss how we've decrypted recent Executive Order, Presidential Executive Order on immigration in historical perspective. As probably many of you know, on January 27th, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order, which was actually revised just yesterday. And essentially, the Executive Order did two things. One is to ban entry of immigrants from a particular country, but predominantly Muslim countries. And then, secondly, the Executive Order also suspended the immigration of refugees, entry of refugees. Movements against one particular important thing about this Executive Order is how the theme of national security is articulated. Here's the passage from the Executive Order, it says in order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and it's founding principles. Now this whole theme, the national security, is not entirely new, historically speaking. In history of anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States. And my talk today is really based on this theme. Throughout the U.S. history, we see rises of anti-immigrant sentiments of various moments. Many things contribute to the rise of nativism in U.S. One is religion, obviously, the Catholics, Jews and recently, Muslims. Their entry really provoked anti-immigrant sentiment. And also race and ethnicity are very important. Early in the 19th century, when a large group of Irish arrived to the United States, typical Irish Catholics, anti-Irish sentiment became really strong, especially among Anglo-Americans. And then, in the late 19th century, when Asian immigrants, especially Chinese immigration expanded, the exotic Asian race, this presence, their presence, really triggered the rise of nativism. And then later on, Mexican immigration did a similar thing. And of course, there's been more dimensional economics in American nativism. The threat of job competition, alleged threat of job competition was a major theme, as well as the poverty of immigrants, which is my big topic, actually. But the point here that I will make here is that all these things, religion, race and ethnicity, economics are consistently translated into the theme of national security. They're consistently translated through the national security discourse. Now you can say that immigration control was framed as a matter of national security to hide, conceal, the underlying race or ethnic prejudice. But my point here is to show the consistency of this theme through a long history of American nativism. And there also is some common cases in which the notion and this theme of national security was used. That the roles that national security play in American nativism, from late 19th century, from mid-19th century on. So my first case is Irish immigration, especially the immigration of Irish Catholics in the mid-19th century. So as a result of this famous potato famine in Ireland, the United States received a large number of heavily impoverished Irish immigrants. And their Catholicism became this first subject of American nativism. Here we have a quote in the anti-Catholic propaganda, that throughout Catholicism whole construction there is not a single element in sympathy with a free energetic and soul inspiring institutions. It's interesting here to see the parallel between anti-Catholicism and anti-Muslim today. Today the popular nativists discourse says there is nothing compatible in Islam with Christianity, so there's a cultural war between Christianity and Muslim. That was kind of popular line of discourse today. But again, in 19th century, the target was Catholicism. And I wanted to pay attention to the title of this nativist publication, The Defense of American Policy, and one of the popular phrases used in this time period is popery or papism, which is a kind of a nativist slogan implying that the Catholics were having conspiracy, developing conspiracy to overturn American democracy with a despotic, hierarchal structure, a hierarchal, despotic Catholic church. And this nativist discourse easily developed into the notion that the United States was being threatened by the army of Catholics. Here's a propaganda poster against the Catholic church or the Catholic priests and also a implication it's anti-Irish. And here, we literally see that a group of priests, Catholic priests were controlling to the American sword and their hats were, they made the priests appear like alligators. The American children were panicked, they're kind of scared by the arrival by Catholic priests. So in this religious discourse here as well, the theme of national security, the threats that the United States was facing from foreigners was very visible. Now Catholicism or religion was not the only arena where anti-Catholic sentiment and the Irish sentiment assumes national security dimension. As I said, many of the Irish were really poor and many of the Irish became a recipient of charity, public welfare. They became charity recipients. And this economic dimension as well was really convoluted to translated to the national security discourse. Here we see this nativist image describing that the entire poorhouse is being shift from Gorey, Ireland to the United States. And the image that this poorhouse would become burdens on American taxpayers. So just like today, nativists said that illegal immigrants were burdens on American taxpayers. They were a growing burden. The poor Irish, Catholic Irish were called literally leeches on our taxpayers. I'm quoting 19th century nativist works. Some states, especially Massachusetts, established, developed a policy for deporting their student immigrants from the United States as matter of public policy. And once again, the issue of economic, were understood of a matter of national security, national defense. Now what kind of threat that the poor Irish were posing, the answer was that the poor immigrants were then threatening public treasuries by becoming paupers. And that's a kind of threat, that's a threat to American's economic security or economic life. And more important dimension here is that it was really important actually endorsed the states and America's right to protect themselves from economic threat which, the poverty of the immigrants, which is equivalent to foreign threat. So here's a Supreme Court decision in a case in 1849. In this case, the Supreme Court says, "States may guard against the introduction of anything "which may corrupt morals or endanger the health "or lives of their citizens. "And states have the right to repel from the shores, "lunatics, idiots, criminals and paupers "as part of the sacred law of self defense." So let me just continue, I want to give you one more thing, one more instance here, words from a mayor of the city, New York City, from the work in 1885, "As the national government had a duty to protect "us from foreign aggression with all account, "so in its duty to protect us against "an enemy of war is sickness and destructive, "that are coming in another form." These quotes are really important because, especially the foreign word. Foreign aggression was not just the, foreign aggression could come in forms other than balls and canon, like direct military aggression, military invasion. Paupers, like economic threats, or the people who would abuse America's tax money, they were equal foreign threats and the states must be protected of this kind of threat, just like in a war time. So there is an equation between foreign war and immigration restriction against poor or undesirable immigrants, pretty much throughout the 19th century, the mid-19th century, against the Irish. Another group that I will mention is Chinese and the policy for excluding Chinese immigrants. In the late 19th century, the exclusion of Chinese became a major issue in American immigration policy. Now the anti-Chinese sentiment itself started to grow in the mid-19th century when the Chinese joined gold mining, the gold rush in California. But then this anti-Chinese sentiment became particularly strong and provoked a larger anti-Chinese movement in 1870s in California. And the slogan was, it really starts poorly, the Chinese must go. And the American workers, including Irish-American workers and Irish immigrant workers, actually, became the major proponents of Chinese exclusion. And their campaign resulted in the passage of the federal Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which suspended the entry of Chinese laborers. Now this Chinese Exclusion Act was the first federal law to restrict immigration on the basis of race and nationality. This is not the first case of immigration control itself in the U.S., they had the precedents for immigration control prior to this time, but the Exclusion Act was first of all, as I said, restricting immigration on the basis of race and nationality. When we look at the discourse on anti-Chinese, the anti-Chinese discourse, there is an interesting convergence of issues of labor, race and police power. One line of argument is white labor cannot compete with Chinese labor. The Chinese immigrants worked for very low wages, to the extent that it threatened white labor, white employment, that's a very major line of argument. And then, here's cultural languages, the cultural argument, "The Chinese race and the American citizen "are in a state of antagonism. "He tied to China who has a call, "he is not for us, he is not of us." So the labor issue is a kind of only one aspect of the anti-Chinese sentiment. And this racial dimension was very strong and actually a major one. But at the same time, here's how the police power kind of comes in this anti-Chinese discourse. Again, U.S. Supreme Court said, "If therefore, the government of the United States "considers that the presence of foreigners, "or different race in this country "who will not assimilate with us to be "dangerous to its peace and security. "Their exclusion is not to be stayed." So once again, the presence of the Chinese was regarded as a thought to the peace and security of the nation and this sentiment was very deeply related to the labor issues and race issues. But we see here consistency of the same notions, same theme, even though the targets were different. Either Chinese or Irish, it was really consistent. Now I want to also move onto a very important development in American immigration discourse. There are several consequences of this national security discourse in American immigration policy. And one very important consequence is the rise of what immigration scholars call the plenary power doctrine in immigration. Plenary power, the plenary adjective here means very strong, absolute. So it's means very strong power, absolute power, over issues of immigration. And this doctrine emerged as a result of some court cases in the late 19th century or early 20th century against the, over the admission of Chinese and Japanese, Asian immigrants. So the doctrine basically assumes that, "As a matter of national sovereignty, "Congress and leaders in policy and Executive Branch "of authority to enforce the law is beyond "judicial oversight for constitutionality." This sounds complicated, but implication is tremendously huge and important. Essentially the doctrine assumes that Congress can do anything with immigration. And the Congress makers of policy should be, will be, regarded as legitimate, even though otherwise, such policy would be regarded as unconstitutional. It's not entirely beyond the judicial oversight of constitutionality, but the constitutional oversight was very limited. Very, very limited in the case of immigration. So the courts, for example, can refuse to review the new immigration cases, even though there was an apparent violation of due process or legal protection. Within this doctrine, immigrants had very limited rights and even though their rights were violated the constitutionality speaking, it's very difficult to make the case for the immigrants. And the due process violation was a very serious one. But then, here in I will provide you some quote here, a quote from one case against Japanese immigrants admission. Even though officials can provide very arbitrary decisions. They may arbitrarily exclude immigrants, but then, it's even such a case, no due process will be violated in enforcement of immigration policy because the Supreme Court said, "The decisions of executive or administrative officers, "acting within powers expressly conferred "by Congress are due process of law." So the simple fact that immigrants were receiving decisions can be regarded as due process of law. So this is a really enormously, this is enormous doctrine. Now this doctrine has a history and it has transformed over the years up to today, but this is a very, itself, influential doctrine working in American immigration. Let me just wrap up a few things. From my talk in the next few minutes. These 19th century developments really laid the foundations for American immigration policy. And like I said, the national security logic remained very consistent and then it created very important consequence, which was the plenary power doctrine. Now the 20th century, if we look at the 20th century developments in immigration policy, we see the centrality of these components, factors. So the National Origins Act of 1924, is an act which essentially entirely suspended Asian immigration, which was regarded as undesirable and threatening for various reasons. And the U.S. Border Control was founded in 1924, mostly to deal with main mix of immigration. Again, Mexican immigrants, very poor laborers, farm workers, they were regarded as mostly not a threat to America's security. And then precisely by the Executive Order that random citizens were incarcerated during World War II for the national security reason. And the President's power was regarded as plenary. And then we have cooperation with that in the mid 20th century. And I just used this paper from then, 1955, I used Patrick Hall's foreign invasion. And it's clear they have national security analogy play a part in the Operation Wetback. (mumbles) Kind of remained out of this. But first of all, I hope it's clear by now to everyone that the national security laws, it gets really central in anti-immigrant discourse from late 19th century onward. Like I said, issues of religion, race and ethnicity, economics or I didn't mention this, but sexuality, morality, public health. There are multiple different factors that shaped the immigration discourse from the 19th century onward. But everything in the organizing theme, if anything consistent that's really emphasized in the national security log here. We also have to think about implications of regulation, regulatory laws and policy. The law and policy didn't exist in a social vacuum, it always had very poor consequences on social levels. So the prospective law and policy always encouraged private violence and hate crimes. in the mid-19th century a Catholic convent was burned down by a mob and Catholics were harassed and sometimes lynched. The Chinese Exclusion law really provoked a series of anti-Chinese violence, like lynchings in very specific Northwestern states. And Mexicans went through similar suffering as well. And I think this is very important because, particularly when we think about the last presidential election, when, then candidate, now President Donald Trump said really nasty things, which I believe, I think it kind of, destroyed the boundaries of appropriate language. And now I think some people don't really hesitate to use bad, nasty language, and the racist language in public sphere and then that and everything that have obviously, has encouraged private violence hate crimes. One more last thing is that the plenary motion that I mentioned is formidable. I hate to finish my presentation with a kind of pessimistic note here. America's immigration policy is still operating under this doctrine, then the President has some power to add on its authority. A provision in America's individual law actually gives the power to the President to ban or remove foreigners who are perceived as a threat to national security. And that kind of power is really formidable. So these are the challenges that we have. That is in the legal doctrine, the courts' authority and the presidential authority over immigration. So with note, I'll stop it there. Thanks for listening. (audience clapping) - Okay, thank you very much, Dr. Hirota, for that interesting talk. It seems to be sadly ironic that the political troubles of today surrounding immigration have increased interest in your scholarship, but that's often the way it works for us academics. I guess you end your talk on a rather pessimistic note. I guess I'm wondering if you can suggest any ways in which we might think about what the future with respect to immigration holds? That might be somewhat less dire. - Let me do speak about that on the positive side. There are things that, there are ways to challenge very less harsh and inhumane immigration policy law. So the first point is that the issues of immigrants were never monolithic. So I introduced a plenary power doctrine as a real cultural power, but that's not the only thing that drives immigration. For example, the Immigration Act of 1965 prohibited the discrimination against immigrants on the basis, religion, things like that. The current Executive Order apparently violates that transport, no discrimination on the basis of race, race and religion, mostly. And also, maybe so Scala is in the courts, also mentioned that Executive Order kind of violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, so that's in the First Amendment. Prohibiting the, the violation of guaranteeing religious freedom. Again, that Executive Order has very apparent anti-Muslim tone, conation. We can argue that it violates this Establishment Clause. But it also, the plenary power doctrine itself, I want to be overly optimistic, but the history shows that the plenary power itself has weakened. Has become weaker over the course of 20th century. Earlier, the plenary power doctrine really denied, mostly entitled due process of law applicable to immigrants, but then the courts these days were recognize due process and legal protection for immigrants in immigration cases. So the courts were again, never, monolithic in this sense. So there are ways to challenge the Executive Order. And then if this is a kind of legal solution, there are things we can do as citizens, students, like on civic levels and if U.S. history tells something for us, I think one of them is that the popular protest, mass protest does make a difference. That reform is not always perfect. And there are always other factors, political policy to the economy, but then still, I think popular protest does make somewhat difference. And then I think the public schools, higher education institutions like City College should take a lead in this effort. - [Andreas] Okay, thank you very much. So we have about 15 minutes. I'd like to request that you please keep your questions short and to the point, yes? - [Audience Member] Great talk and I get the big picture. But I'm still asking myself why is happening? Is it sheer unbridled racism? You didn't much about how economics play into this. I wonder if you could give us your interpretation as to why this is happening? Is it just white people misbehaving or what is it? - The present nativism? - No, from the start. You showed Uncle Sam kicking some Chinese people down, is it just happening here also? Is it maybe more international than you might recognize? We seem to be saying it's a U.S. problem, but maybe it's not. - The answer is yes and no. It is a U.S. problem in many ways. I think nativism arose from a combination of multiple factors like religion, economics and ethnic racial prejudice. And I can't just identify one single decisive factor, but then I think that the Founders, for example, back in the 18th century, didn't really imagine that society would become this diverse. And that the first tested case really came with the arrival of the Irish. The vast majority of them were Catholics. And religion was much important in society than it is now and the Protestant Americans seriously felt that America's democracy would be overturned by these despotic Catholics. But then there is also an ethnic dimension as well. The middle of 19th century Americans of Anglo descent. They descend from English immigrants, settlers, originally. Especially Massachusets, they were descendants of Puritans who hated Catholics and Irish, the Celtic people. When poverty of immigrants, Irish ethnicity, Catholicism came together, that's well enough foundation for the rise of eruption of nativism. And on the same kind of observation can apply to Chinese case and also Italian, Greeks, Jewish, immigrants coming from Eastern Southern Europe at the turn of the 20th century. And it makes (mumbles). - [Andreas] Further questions? - Is there a split between? Because it seems like there's sort of two sides ideologically. Or at least two prominent factors are the national security because people are dangerous, they're a threat to our way of life, and on the other hand the people are taking our jobs, they're a threat to our financial stability. So it seems like currently, one half is tied more to Mexican immigration and one half is tied more to immigration from the Middle East. Like it's sort of separated different groups. So these represent, do these two fears, can they be separated? Are the fundamentally different and they just happen to converge sometimes? Or what's their relationship to one another? - That's a very good question. You can say that, yeah, the legal immigration was a economic one and Muslim immigration is a religious issue and I think that distinction is correct. But at the same time, the broader notion of security, national security, like the broader force to protect the United States from external, something external, something externally, something undesirable coming from outside the United States. This notion is I think universal in nativism, I guess, both forms of immigration. We can distinguish, and that distinction is totally valid, but at the same time, the fear of undesirable groups of people, people of this other culture, and the notion that they would kind of overturn American society. I think, in the essence, yeah, I think the two forms of immigration have converged. - [Mikhail] Professor Stein before you spoke about the fact that corporate America actually supports immigration at the present moment. And I was wondering if you could speak to the history of that and whether that inadvertently would be a force, actually a force that could work against the president? - Native born Americans were, again, never monolithic. And especially the business sectors remained kind of critical, opposing immigration control, pretty much after the 19th century onward to this day. The Irish immigrants were obviously a very important source of labor. Vast majority of them were allowed to land in part because they were a very important source of labor. But then, even in the Chinese case, the entrepreneurs, capitalists, the owners of railroad companies, they welcomed Chinese labor because it's cheap. Capitalism was the biggest opponent of the Chinese Exclusion policy. They retained against Chinese Exclusion policy, pretty much. And even today, there is restrictive laws, discriminatory laws, immigration laws, in some of the southern states, southwestern states, Arizona, for example, but then they are the local business. And the tourism industry was very against the discriminative laws because it really harms the economy. And I'm sorry, I skipped mass immigration in the early 20th century, but even the act of 1924 really broadly suspended, restricted immigration, it cut Asian immigration entirely and it reduced drastically immigration from Eastern Europe immigration, that law, the Immigration Act in 1924, exempted immigrants from Western Hemisphere from exclusion. That is to say, the Canadians and Mexicans were allowed to enter the United States. Even in some restricted mindset climate. The primary reason for this Mexican exemption was that the farm labor of the farm companies, in the Southwest desperately needed Mexican labor. They just can't afford to lose the labor force. There's always tension between the capitalists, the need for labor and also cultural, the nativist force in immigration policy. - [Andreas] We have time for one more question. - Thank you, my question is concerning media culture. More specifically, the real speed of it in our contemporary lifestyle is unfathomable. But this was not only the case. Certainly the 18th to 19th century functioned much differently. But nonetheless, as you in your talk, you've said how different centralics of power under government, and how we see different ethos as to who is crafting local over national law against immigration. But I'm curious to know how one can wake up in the morning and still feel hatred for their neighbor who might take their job. So I'm curious to know what's the relationship between media culture is spreading outward, towns, villages, kind of how they were manufacturing fear, in a sense, to move national policy forward? - So there are, back then, the important media outlet was periodicals. Pictorial magazines like Harper's Weekly or other national level magazines. And they played a very important role in exaggerating, first of all, the cultural biological alleged biological characteristics of immigrants. There were a series of, they were actually cartoons. And the cartoons have described immigrants in really derogatory ways. And that's actually part of all the U.S. culture. This cartoon, the derogatory cartoons, started with the description of African Americans. Early in the 19th century. And that actually shows an attitude of immigrants. So the periodicals are really standing with the courts name. But while that is, it also wasn't straight forward. It was a magazine. And obviously, the magazine will describe Northwest immigrants as super inferior and super undesirable. So that's avenue of magazines' cartoons, I think did drive even modest Americans, Americans who would otherwise be tolerant of immigrants toward this cause. And also, 10th century, as well. The images of a farm worker as a poor workers, images of undesirable groups of people, the foreigners, through reporters, were circulated. And also, the other side is that the images risk, that the immigrant threats, were also circulated regardless of race. Especially during Operation Wetback. That created that fear factor so that immigrants would feel that they should not be staying in the United States. So that they would self-deport. So this kind of fear from the other was also very a important part of I think, the larger nativist thought being introduced. - Okay, thank you very much. (audience clapping) Dr. Grossman is a Professor of Modern European and German History, she teaches at Cooper Union. She is also, I should mention, an alum of this institution. She got her undergraduate degree here in 1973. - [Atina] Two, but then I stayed 'til '73. - So many, many years ago. - Many, many. - She has great stories to tell about those days. About the wild days of the 1970s at City College. Anyways, Dr. Grossman is the author of numerous books, amongst them, most recently a book titled Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century and that came out in 2002 and subsequently her book Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany came out in 2007. She has held many fellowships and is a member of various national and international academic organizations. And she will speak to us today about, well, she will offer us a perspective on on contemporary events from the perception of somebody who's an expert on the themes here. - Thank you, thanks Andreas. And yes, as Andreas said, I am an alum. I suppose many of you in the audience are students. I was here at a particularly tumultuous time. And I was basically from 1969 to 1973. And it's interesting, I just can't resist remarking that the gentleman over here who said that since 1968, public education has been in decline. And of course, what we thought we were doing in 1968, '69 was improving public education by opening it up. By opening it up, through the black and Puerto Rican students riot in 1969. By the women's movement through the activism around Kent State, Cambodia, agitation around the war. Around establishing women's studies programs, African American studies programs. So its actually, in a sense, it was also an interesting moment where there was this kind of older tradition of City College as the Harvard of the proletariat, and then there was that challenging moment of saying, well, actually, we want to be a different kind of portrait of a proletariat, we also want to be a school that serves the community and there were a lot of tensions and conflicts around that. But it was also, I think, and I'm just, I don't know, I'm inspired by being here, none of which existed, of course, when I was here. I'm realizing that there actually was that moment of being at City in the late '60s and the early '70s that turned me into a German historian because we were actually interested. At that particular moment, with the U.S. involved in imperialist wars with these challenges coming from formerly non-represented groups saying, "We belong here, too." (phone ringing) Ooh, that is not supposed to happen. Sorry, just like my sneezing isn't supposed to happen. That we did think a lot about the question of fascism. That F word and how it did come to power, what were the failures, particularly of the left that contributed to the triumph of fascism in Europe, broadly, and of national socialism in particular in Germany. Those were questions that seemed very burning at the time and that slogan of Never Again, which I think today, it often gets associated with never again, the Holocaust, or never again, genocide. For us, at the time, I think never again, which we used rather liberally, that term, really meant never again, a good German. It didn't mean never again a victim. It meant, never again a good German. Quote, unquote, in other words that somehow, it was what he had learned from history, we thought, was that it was important to beware the signs to resist as best one could and not be sort of drawn into situations that could lead to the rise of fascism. And also, I think we started out with this discussion about the role of the university, and I think today, we think of the university as a place that is beleaguered by the forces that are, that see the university as a place of political correctness, that see it as a place that wants to deny the right of conservatives to speak, that is indoctrinating students in all these terrible things, left-wing and so on, thinking that the study of marginalized groups is important, rather than Western Civ, as we saw. Whereas, I think at the time, we saw it, and so now it's like I think we feel a sense of kinship with the university as we're trying to defend ourselves. And at the time, it was more the other way around that we felt like we needed fight the university in order to get it to open up. That sort of famous slogan was actually Columbia's '68 slogan, work, study, get ahead and kill. That's not what we really wanted. And Andreas said I have too many stories, I'm not going to wax sort of oh, back in the day. But it is interesting to think of those particular moments where the F word has, as it were, has arisen again. And I think that what Andreas and Mikhail had in mind was for me to say a couple of things about not the parallels, and maybe not even the analogies, but the signals that might be useful, maybe, in looking back at that particular history. I do think, and you just heard this wonderful talk on the history of American nativism and immigration. I do feel like much of what we're facing now can be located in the particularities of American history. Which I sort of gave up on at City College, because I got so excited by German history. I had some fabulous professors. But I think it is also undeniable that there are, and I'm sure I'm not telling you anything that you don't know that there are these pieces of Alt-Right and white nationalist media and propaganda, and also above all, symbolism. Steve Bannon is a poster boy for this. That draw directly from a European fascist heritage. And use that, use a certain kind of language or symbols that do come out of the '30s. So what does that mean? What do we make of that? Do we freak out and say, "Oh, fascism is coming." I think Judy Stein made the point that she's seen with people using that term. And I tend to think that, yeah, there's not a lot of purchased in arguing about is this fascism, how is this like Nazi Germany? There only person that seems to have said it's like Nazi Germany so far really is Donald Trump, when was saying the FBI was treating him, or the intelligence community, sorry, intelligence community. But clearly people are asking is there a kind of a Weimar Moment that we can recognize? Are there elements of the kind of fascist sensibility, fascist organization that might help, that we should look for, not because we think it's the same, it's obvious that history does not repeat itself. It doesn't, if it did, it would be a lot easier to figure out what was going on right now. But there are perhaps some signs, some signals, some elements and I think that just to go through a couple of things, of these elements. One thing of course that characterizes this collapse of what was already, and that was actually different, I think, than what the U.S. has been experiencing. What was already extraordinarily fragile and young republic, people always talk about Weimar as the republic that nobody wanted. In fact, it was the first book I ever read in German history class at City College was called The Republic That Nobody Wanted, and it referred to Wiemar. But is this notion of a kind of loss of faith in liberal democracy. A loss of legitimacy for parliamentary democracy. There's a historian named Mark Mazower who talks about this period of the late 1920s and the early 1930s and it just describes parliamentary democracy as a, quote, deserted temple, it's melodramatic. But there's a profound sense on the part of many people from the left and the right and across the political spectrum, that the government within these structures of parliamentary democracy doesn't work. That it's paralyzed, that it's full of people yelling at each other and spewing propaganda, lies, a kind of polarization where people, cannot, I believe people cannot work together, that exist in conventional political parties, in order to meet the needs of the people they claim to represent. And that it is very little possibility for forging the kind of workable consensus that governments actually do need in order to legislate, in order to give people the type of things we need. Education, health, welfare, protection, a reasonable conduct of foreign affairs that we would expect from government. So I think this element of crisis legitimacy, a loss of faith, a loss of confidence in government as such. And that loss of faith, or sense of legitimacy in government was kind of created by a vicious cycle, in the sense that by 1930, because there was a profound economic crisis, much, much, much, more dramatic than what we've experienced in this slow motion crisis that started in 2008. We heard about stagnant wages, we heard about a slow recovery, but this was a Great Depression. This was massive unemployment, this was an unemployment that affected at least every other family in one form or another, sometimes indirectly. So that by 1930 already, the kind of democratic coalition that had been ruling German moderate socialists and centrist parties, the details are not so relevant right now. Essentially, gave up. Because they had to make a decision about whether or not to continue the benefits that had been granted by this young experiment in democracy, which was the Weimar republic. Which had, in fact, expanded cultural innovation. Had expanded social rights, women had gotten to vote. Jews were now able to enter the civil service in a way that they hadn't before. Unions had gotten new powers, in terms of negotiating wages and hours, there had been an expansion of health insurance. And in 1927, there had actually been the passage, for the first time ever, before the New Deal ever came along, of unemployment insurance in 1927. And at the time that this unemployment insurance was passed, nobody thought that one would have mass unemployment. This was supposed to deal with normal unemployment. By 1930, this unemployment insurance program is in complete crisis because, pushed by the stock crash and all kinds of bank failures. The system was just under so much pressure that it couldn't meet the needs of its clients and people were getting angry, not at the bosses, but at the government, because the government wasn't able to fulfill its promise. And in that moment, the coalition government, which was led by social democrats, left-wing moderate socialists, they clutched. They said, "We don't know what to do." Because if we meet the needs of our constituents who are screaming for more benefits, we're going to be fiscally irresponsible. We going to go into more deficit financing and everybody knew that back in 1923, after World War I, Germany had been struck by a horrific inflation. So everybody was terrified of inflation. They thought you cannot have deficit financing. We have to balance the budget. But by balancing the budget, they understood that they were going to lose exactly the voters that they needed. Namely, the working class voters. And so what did they do? Instead of figuring out what to do, they gave up. They said, ah, we don't know and they called new elections. At exactly the worst moment in a sense. When the country is in upheaval, there's tremendous anxiety, there's tremendous fear. And in that moment, and it really was this moment of these new elections after March 1930, it did seem like something fundamental shifted. So yes, you have these kind of longed arrays and you can say, oh there were all these long-term trends, and a super dramatic change doesn't happen. But super dramatic change did happen. Within one election, a number of national socialist deputies shot up from 12 to 107. And that meant, and again, this is a big huge difference from today, that meant if you had people walking into Parliament wearing brown uniforms and swastikas and making very, very clear that they had no intention of respecting the rule of law or parliamentary procedures. At the same time, to a lesser degree, the communist vote went up. And it was at that point that then, that essentially parliamentary democracy stopped. The country turned to rule by emergency decree, which was essentially Executive Order. Because there was, which we do not have in our Constitution, we want our President to be able to protect the national security, but there was a clause in the constitution that said in a time of national emergency, the Executive Branch can rule by Executive Decree. And that is indeed what happened from 1930 on. So there was this kind of moment where it became a self-fulfilling prophecy. People had lost faith, in the possibilities of government. But then, government was so disempowered and turned into, depending on how you saw it, either a circus or a horror show, thinking about these people in brown uniforms screaming at each other. That it was clear then it was something that couldn't taken seriously. But obviously, I'm simplifying it, over-generalizing. And it was at that point that I think that a couple of other things, just to lay out a few more alerts, a couple of other things I think really kicked in. One was this term that I think we've been hearing a lot, but which again, I remember first encountering in my reading of the book that I first read at City College, back in the day, called The Nazi Seizure of Power, by William Sheridan Allen, you're nodding. Sort of a local history and a politics of fear. A politics of fear. That it wasn't even so much the people who had actually lost their jobs, many of whom were turning, actually to the left, who were looking towards a radical solution beyond political parties. Non-traditional political parties. So we're looking to this movement that was dynamic, that was performative, that had wonderful rallies. That was able to use new media in a way that the other parties weren't. That had really figured out how to use radio. The Nazis were the first group to use the airplane for campaigning, some of you may have seen Triumph of the Will. That has mastered the idea of using this new faster media, of course it's nothing compared to the kind of media we have today, but at the time it seemed a lot faster. That also mastered the idea of targeted propaganda. In other words, they would talk about certain issues to certain groups and other issues to other groups. And make it seem, for example, that anti-Semitism wasn't necessarily the most important issue. They would simply not talk about it. That was something that people had to be willing to take on board, but it wasn't necessarily the main issue. So there's a kind of ability to propagandize, there's a degraded political discourse that plays on a politics of fear that says, you could be next. You might lose your job. Actually, you're still okay. Which is, I think, the American's historians and analysts will have to correct this, but I think we've been seeing a lot of that, too. That a lot of the fear example, immigrants and refugees is highest at times and places where there are the fewest. But the way that this sense of being able to exploit the politics of fear and then exploit also, the notion of, I actually don't like this word, but maybe it's useful, to exploit certain groups as quote, unquote, scapegoats. And if you're looking for groups to focus on, in this particular situation, there will always be groups. Because there was a legacy of defeat. This idea Germany had been defeated in World War I, but it hadn't been defeated on the battlefield, it had been stabbed in the back by these internal elements. That wished Germany evil, did not believe that Germany should win. Were not real Germans, right, were not real Germans. And those three groups were women, who were seen as having mutinied, as not having worked hard enough on the home front. Who had been agitating over their own rights. Jews, who were associated with speculation, that international conspiracy of global capital, when you hear the dog whistles now in certain rhetoric coming out of the Trump camp. Who was seen as having speculated and hoarded and not participated fully enough in defending the country in World War I, even though that was totally fake news. And it was manifest and statistically not true, but there were enough media outlets that propagated that. And also an organized working class. The organized working class, which then was able to gain, in a sense, from the republic that emerged out of defeat. So using those people who had been accused of having stabbed Germany in the back, again, as said, these are the people who are threatening us. These are the people who are stopping Germany from being able to overcome the shame, the shame of the post-war, the Treaty of Versailles, the shame of defeat. And that was always Jews, women and an organized working class. This way of playing on people's fears also created a kind of secondary fear, if you will. I just have to keep track of time. - Yeah, you have time. - Yeah, good. A kind of secondary fear in politicians who kind of knew that this was not true. That this was not everyone's base. But were fearful of the fear of their constituents. So not only do you have a politics of fear, but you have politics of the fear of fear. Which led moderate or non-Nazi right-wingers to hang their hat with this extreme group. That they expected fully to be able to control, that they figured, look, this guy is charismatic, he's going to be able to get votes for us, he's got a movement, not just a party. An ability to use media, an ability to stage rallies that we don't have. But it's okay, don't worry. Because we're the elites. We really do control the banks. We really do control the press. Even though the story was the Jews that were controlling the banks and the lying press, the liberal press. They were willing to make those deals and let a representative of this party, which had been seen as a complete fringe lunatic party, there plenty of people who listened to the Nazis speak and said, this is crazy. This guys is a loony-tunes. Who could possibly ever vote for him? Were willing to suspend their sense of anxiety about this and say, he's going to make sure that the gains, the social welfare gains of the Weimar Republic were rolled back, he's going to make sure that the decline of Germany internationally would then stop, that the threat of communism will be contained and then, once he's Chancellor, we'll have the majority of the seats in the cabinet and we'll control it. And indeed, at the beginning, it was a completely hybrid government. And that's like where I would stop for now, to say that, the first cabinet only had two national socialists in it, plus the Chancellor. It just so happened that one of those national socialists was the Minister of Interior, which meant that he was in charge of prisons, the terror apparatus, the security apparatus. And then once in power, once they realized that maybe they couldn't control him, they said, that's okay, too, because he's basically doing what we want to do. And then what we see, and this is like the, to me, the sort of scary part. Is that with an extraordinary rapidity, within maybe six months, these institutions of civil society, that were frayed, that were very frayed, basically were destroyed. The free press was destroyed. The unions were banned, political parties were banned. Other political parties, it happened really quickly. It happened with the acquiescence of the so-called reasonable right. It happened by destroying the spaces in which all of those people who were still there, who were opposed, who were actually the majority, who were actually the majority, the Nazis never got more than 43% of the vote, even in an election that was after a lot of repression. After Hitler was Chancellor. But it was very quickly possible to shut down the spaces in which people organize, in which they could write freely, in which they could speak to each other, to set up wild concentration camps, to arrest people in the middle of the night. And that happened even as life as usual went on. Yes, maybe there were banners in the street, but people still went to the movies, Hollywood movies still played, people still drank Coca-Cola. They went to their cafes and unless you were directly part of it, for quite a long time life went on. And that to me, as I sort of try to suss out, well, what are the moments that are anxiety producing for me now? Many, but also how do we think about our own lives now? It's that balance between the fact that life went on. It wasn't like okay, this is it. Life went on. And yet, very quickly, there was this kind of so called synchronization that shut down the very real possibilities that did exist for a kind of resistance. So it's not going to happen like that, clearly. But I think there are some points that we might think about and also points where we might think about where do we want to cut in? What are moments where it's possible to resist? - Okay, thank you very much. (audience clapping) I must tell you that I'm a German historian myself and I'm inclined to be very skeptical of the analogy between what happened in Germany then and what's going on in the United States now, which is an analogy that is the political commentary all the time nowadays. But listening to you, Atina, when you run the unemployment, new media, politics of fear, conspiracy theory, it all sounds very comparable to what's going on right now. Anyways, we are pressed for time, so I'm not going to pose any questions, I'm just going to open things up. We have time maybe for two questions, so please keep your questions short and to the point. Who would like to address a question? - Of course, give us the question. - [Audience Member] Yeah, yeah, yeah, I have many. I want to address the component of fear in your speech. And how it ties into the university today, where you think this should go. Trump, by no means, created this system of slashing humanities, but he did inherit it, and is now playing a bigger role in slashing it some more. So when speaking about Nazi Germany, we find that the historiography that's made for the story of how historians sort history, they sought to find truth within generalities. And it seems as though today, this is where our, the duty of scholarship is for. But my question is regarding funding in that you find scholarship is now twisting, bending so that it can be published. Which is essentially changing the scope of how we even understand the past. Such things as American exceptionalism, 9/11, terrorism, these are all, even within Western tradition of European history and America's, is changing the scope of how we look at the past. How do you think scholarship should start responding to this problem where it's publish or die? - Well, I don't know if it's publish or die so much as we heard from our colleague about what's happening as an example with the environmental policy, or just the whole idea of this evidence society's had of wanting to protect the pursuit of knowledge and scholarship that I think it's going to require a lot of very creative thinking on the part of universities in terms of, yes, where do get your funding? Now the U.S. has the advantage as against Europe today also, that for better or for worse, we actually don't have so much state funding, right? So there are lots of private, there's private fundraising, that to some degree one may have to turn to, in order to keep supporting the kind of endeavors that we need to protect and it's incredibly important to protect. But I'm more, just very quickly, I think on a more just personal level, there is, I think, we also think about self-censorship. I think we see it in news outlets, we even see it in NPR. A kind of self-censorship that sets in, that sort of preemptive silencing, to want to prove, oh, but we are so objective. When in fact, it's the objectiveness that's being threatened in the first place. And again, this is not an analogy, but it's just that as a German historian, you're always looking at how quickly things can collapse and things can go wrong. Doesn't mean that they're going to go wrong in the same way. The remarkable speed with which, for example, Jews were removed from the editorial boards, from the mass texts of professional journals. Even before it was decreed. Just like say, but we want to make sure that we can keep publishing. So it's better that you should leave and we'll stay because we're the good guys and we're going to keep it going. And then of course, two months later, it didn't make a difference because the journal was shut down anyway, even though they had been so careful to remove the names of the Jews. So there's that, I think, it's that kind of thinking about how do we act? And what are the consequences of even our small actions that I worry about. - Other questions? - There's one. Did you have a question? I'm sorry, I shouldn't be interrupting. - I was wondering about, will people make a lot of points about ideological similarities among certain segments of the right in support of Donald Trump and of course, the Nazi Party. Do you think that there are ideological differences between other groups of his supporters? Though you have the one hand, the Nazis, though they held up a lot of platforms and supported a lot of things, depending on who they were trying to get votes from, they have a very strong theme of control and greater security and shutting things down and making government stronger and more powerful. And I feel like if you take that, on the other hand, a lot of Donald Trump supporters are of the Libertarian persuasion. Smaller government, less government control, more leaving people alone, do you think this is potentially a significant difference between the two? - I think there are a myriad of significant differences. And yes, one of them, of course, has to do with A, the sort of relative, relative robustness of American institutions, compared to this very young democracy in Germany. The fact that we're not in the middle of this total economic crisis and yes, that is a really different relationship to the state. That is without a doubt. I do think that at the point at which, there's some kind of strange convergence that had taken place where people who are disillusioned with government and say, "I don't want government "controlling my life," on the other hand could be very attracted to movements that say, this new movement that's going to take over the government will save you. And so that's, I think, the point to think about. That there could be a convergence of that sort of Libertarian, quote, unquote, view, with the big government, let's have a kind of totalitarian control. So yeah, we're not going to get around having to say look, history can only get us so far. And it's not going to, and I do think we heard such interesting material about all the ways in which the U.S. has staged this for itself. But I also think it's very clear that some of the folks around Trump have, they know this history backwards and forwards. They studied it and I think we have to assume that they know what they're doing when they're writing some of these speeches. - [Andreas] Okay, thank you. (audience clapping) - Dr. Vorosmarty is Distinguished Scientist and Director of the CUNY ASRC's Environmental Sciences Initiative in the Agricultural Department. He is also co-Chair of the Global Water System Project, which represents the input of several hundred international scientists under the International Council for Science's Global Environmental Change Programs. He wears many, many hats, he advises a variety of U.S. and international water consortia and is currently spearheading efforts to develop global-scale indicators of water stress alongside chief United Nations delegates. - Thank you, this talk, if I can bring it up, and I don't see it here. Here it is, I think. So this might be viewed as a little bit of a curve ball, compared to the other talks, but I actually like sharing the podium with, and I've done this a few times, with historians. Because historians do take that very, very long-term view and they probably put things into context. My job today is to try to put some of the important ideas coming out of the environmental research community into a broad perspective and important to Trump, I don't mean that to use that word, the historians. I'm also going to look into the future and what patterns in the past might have set up in terms of what we're looking to in the future. I put a bunch of logos, I know that's probably complicated to many of you because these logos might not mean much to you. I put these logos on there because these are the agencies that have had faith in the research team that is upstairs on the fifth floor, over our many years of doing business with federal and non-federal agencies. And what it is really, is meant to remind you that this is an investment society has already made in generating knowledge, generating truth, if you will, about the state of affairs with respect to the environment. And it's an investment that if we're not careful, we may lose as we begin to deconstruct, or as certain elements of the government wish to deconstruct the research establishment. That they're literally, our group and many, many, many other groups probably represent trillions of dollars of knowledge generation that is in jeopardy. Let me put this on bright mode here. Interesting, okay. Here's some quotes, I guess one of the earlier speaker had some quotes from some very early work on nativism. This is probably too detailed to go through, so if you could just read it yourselves. I wanted to remind people that the EPA, since we're talking about environmental protection here, the EPA is founded in 1975 by, of all people, Richard Nixon. Some people say, "Well, he was a closet environmentalist." And others would say he was doing it for political expediency, I kind of fall on that particular sword myself. But nonetheless, this administration started the Environmental Protection Agency. There was a great impetus in the country to do so. In the meantime, of course a lot has happened, and if you follow what then candidate Trump was saying about the environment and in particular, talking about the Environmental Protection Agency, it was vilified. He'd be just fine without it, for example, he mentioned. He said wind turbines, clean energy, are a scourge on communities and wildlife. They're environmental disasters. His EPA transition team head, Myron Ebell, is a climate denier and he also does not believe in environmental regulation because he feels that it's quote, unquote, "One of the greatest "threats to freedom in our modern world." Enormous hyperbole having to do with environmental protection, something that was accepted by, of all things, an administration back in the early 1970s. His new chief of the EPA, Scott Pruitt, sued the EPA 13 times, Trump's EPA head. But as Attorney General of Oklahoma he says that focus on climate change is going to kill jobs and economic growth, going to roll back those regulations in a very aggressive way. And the administration in general is really hellbent on trying to eliminate some of the Obama policy shifts. Not just in the healthcare domain, but two of his capstone efforts, that is Obama's capstone efforts, the Climate Action Plan and the Waters of the U.S. Rule. Okay, with this as the background, and with the notion of environmental protection in the new realities of the day, I'm going to let you draw your own conclusions. So does environmental protection really hurt the economy? Now I'm trying to take a really broad view. I'm trying to get out of the moment, the chaos of this moment. So let's take a pretty broad view. This is the long-term real growth, this is real dollars, so it's a distinct benchmarks for inflation, of U.S. Gross Domestic Product, one measure success for the economy, per capita. Per person wealth generation. Well, there's ups and downs of course. But if look at it over a century time scale. And I've actually pointed out when the EPA was founded. I don't see much, certainly, I don't see a causal effect between an environmental protection agency coming into play and halting the growth of the economy. It's on an inexorable rise. And in point of fact, this is one measure among many, many other measures that's indicating that humans are really beginning to do, control major systems on the planet. And were part of something called a great acceleration. The image on the left is from an Economist article a few years back and what it's trying to do is it's trying to recognize a current within the environmental sciences community to talk about something called the anthroposphere. We're at a geological epoch, I guess officially called the Holocene, but the idea is that because humans are accelerating their use of resources, are embedding themselves deeply into the climate system, are becoming a dominant force on planet Earth, maybe we should consider calling this geological epoch the Anthropocene, so the Economist in its good way, tries to pick on what's happening at the start of the art in different sciences and such. It featured this on the cover, welcome to the Anthropocene. Well, what is the Anthropocene? It's all the stuff you see on the right. It's this great acceleration which particularly started after World War II. All of these rises in these ingredients of the Anthropocene and I'm not sure you could read it, from the back, and I'm not sure I have, do I have a pointer here? Yeah, I do have a pointer. If you look at 100, sorry, 250 years of human development. You could look at population, the damning of rivers, urban population, motor vehicle transport, telecommunications, paper consumption, foreign investment, McDonald's. All this stuff is going on at a very, very rapid rate, exponentially. And that's what this great acceleration is about. So we're mobilizing the world's resources, the world's environment, in a sense, to support our well-being and our lifestyles. Our growing population and our economic development. And that's really the fundamental feature about what's forcing all of this. So it should be no surprise that the economy is growing great, gangbusters, because of all this other stuff. This is backing it up. This is propelling it forward. Environmental scientists, global scale environmental scientists have begun to take stock of these changes in aggregate. And I don't know if any of you in the room have heard of a global ecological footprint, it's an accounting scheme to try to synthesize all of those human activities and assess how much of the Earth's environmental services are necessary to support on a sustainable basis, human enterprise. And they go back to 1960 and they end in 2050. This is basically, this vertical axis, the number of planet Earths necessary to support humanity. And we passed the one full Earth needed to support humanity sustainably from about 1970, about the time the Environmental Protection Agency came into be, believe it or not. And follow the trajectory, we're now at about 1.25 Earths and depending on the decisions we make or decisions forced on us the planetary restrictions that we might be bumping into, we're going to go down, but maybe not that far, or we're going to way up a point where, by the year 2050, that's not too far off, folks, that's going to be three Earths to support our lifestyles, our population and our aspirations to bring wealth to all of humankind. That's just one indicator. The other indicator is this idea, and you might want to jot notes down, I could make this presentation available to you, but these are important ideas that have come out of the community in the last 10 to 15 years. There this idea of having planetary boundaries. And on a variety of dimensions shown around the circle here, climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone, nitrogen pollution, global land use, biodiversity loss, species losses, atmospheric aerosols, chemical pollution. Any time you see this broadcast of color, growing past this outside boundary, we've exceeded the planet's capacity to absorb those changes. And the big ones are biodiversity change and actually nitrogen pollution, which is an absolute requirement for human food security, because we fertilize our crop land and we create protein sources that we then eat. Planetary values, that literature, if you're not familiar with it, you should become familiar with it. Another thing is something that I was involved in about 10 years ago, a little bit more than 10 years ago, and it's something called the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. This was a report that was similar scope, I guess, to the IPCC, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, but it looked at the state of affairs with respect to ecosystems at the turn of the century. This is a report written by about 800 scientists, I was one of the 800. I led a chapter on water of all things, my area of expertise. And what I want you to look at here is, for a series of these ecosystems, about 10 major ecosystems on planet Earth, this is planetary accounting. The question was what's the state of affairs with respect to these systems? And the colors means how important or unimportant those ecosystems are, whether it's forest, dry lands, coastal systems, mountain systems, polar systems, to global biodiversity. Those are the colors and the red are the more important. But that's not the important thing in my view. The important thing in my view is the arrow. And the arrow is going up, shows that the systems are under increasing risk. There are some flat arrows, arrows that stay pretty much stable and in only one case is the arrow going down. Happens to be temperate forest systems. Everywhere else, everywhere where these 800 scientists looked, there was imperilment of the basic ecosystems. So if we're expecting to have more than one planet Earth to support us, we're not really doing a great job on being stewards of the single planet Earth ecosystems that we analyzed back in 2005. Again, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, big study that was a real game changer in terms of looking at these development issues. This is work from my old group, this is a complicated set of maps, perhaps. But I'll step you through it quickly. There are three maps shown. The top map is our best accounting of the provisioning services that nature gives us, in terms of clean water. So nature tries to give us that quantity of water, shown in the top graph. Blue waters, the darker blue meaning more people served by those water resources. So you start with a nice blue planet and then you basically populate the globe with people and their economic activities, including trying to grow crops to feed this large population, urban systems, all sorts of stuff. And you take that beautiful blue map and you turn it into a red and yellow map, where the reds and the yellows mean that there is incident threat, threat has been imposed on this otherwise wonderful water resource. It's our impairment of those water resources. It's how we screw the system up, as byproduct of our development. And you might look at places like Europe and the United States and the United States has the EPA. How come the EPA didn't protect us from these red areas, which are really heavily threatened? It's because we don't do a great job, despite the fact that there's an Environmental Protection Agency, despite that fact. And so what do we do? I go to the kitchen, I turn the faucet on and the water's clean, and it's always there. It's an assured source of water. So how do we get from threatened water back to the blue water? Well, what we do is we throw about half a trillion to 3/4 of a trillion dollars at the problem of cleaning up and fixing all of these impaired waterways in the background so that when I turn the faucet on in the bathroom here or the kitchen upstairs, it's nice and secured, it's back to blue. But I do it at enormous cost. I could do it, Europe could do, Japan could do it. Most of the developing world is stranded because they don't have the resources to invest in that remediation. So we call it impair and repair. My friends would call it, why don't you just say break it and fix it? That's basically what it is. That's the way we operate, for water and for a lot of other stuff. In the context of all this, getting back to the notion of environmental protection, there's a fairly big literature, it's not organized in any way, but you could go out there and find all sorts of examples of how it's way better to protect these systems rather than fix the systems. Some examples are, for example, 50:1 payback, dollar wise, in terms of over $100 billion of U.S. reduced healthcare costs from atmospheric pollution. At only $2 billion expense to the utilities and the utilities scream and yell about $2 billion. But these poor people who would be suffering would suffer, essentially silently, unless you have these laws restricting these pollutants. The toxic air standards, which were challenged by EPA Chief Pruitt, when he was Attorney General of Oklahoma, were supposedly, for his state, to save 150 to $350 billion in healthcare costs. I'm sorry, nationally. But he was arguing against the EPA rules as state Attorney General. 6:1 payback for protecting watersheds that feed our water supply. And if you used flood plains, natural ecosystems to control floods instead of allowing floods to occur, you have 100:1 payback on investing in these natural ecosystems. If you used dams and reservoirs, it's still a big deal, 6:1 payback. But it's nothing like 100:1. So there's great value in my view of making sure you protect and when necessary, revitalize these ecosystems that have very important social dimensions but also an economic value. It's not that hard to actually argue this. Now cranking back a little bit, here's 1972, there's something called the limits to growth. Again, for those of you who don't know about this stuff, you should know about this stuff. And I've been looking back at some of this work early from the '70s because it's now coming to a head with the challenges that we see emerging in the 21st century now. And this is a book that was published by the Club of Rome. One of the main proponents is a guy named Dennis Meadows, who ended his career at my old university, the University of New Hampshire. And I'm going to do probably the bravest thing you've seen any speaker do, the whole three hours here. I'm going to show you what things look like, at what my limits to growth were back in 1972. I couldn't grow a beard back then, now there's no limit to that growth. And you can imagine this kid, I was just coming out of high school, I came out of high, I graduated in '72. Looking at this stuff, these were the spaghetti bowl diagrams that came out of this analysis. And it's hard to read, but this was the state of the art computing systems back in the early 1970s. You had these big pages that were produced and it took a long time to print them. And this is what you would get. And just to clarify this a little bit, back in 1972, when I was reading this stuff, these guys were forecasting the future. They were looking out to the year 2100, all future stuff. I got older, time has passed, and back up in the early 2000s, they started a series of studies to check these results. Because we had 30 to 40 years of real data to compare to. So it wasn't a formula, you could actually look backwards and say how well did they do? And in many of the dimensions that they looked at, per capita wealth, the birth rates, death rates, food supply, population, industrial output, and pollution, the systems were dead on in terms of what they predicted early on and what the real data showed. That's the good news for the modelers. The terrible news is if it were to follow this, I know it's a spaghetti bowl, but all these inflection points, all these things coming down is an indication that the system is collapsing. That there are going to be severe limits to what a planet that inherently has limits can produce. Technology can help us some, but there's this basic intrinsic idea that there are limits to what the system can hold. We can argue 'til the cows come home about what parameters were used and we could fiddle around with it, but when we reanalyze this, there's a statement here that you probably cannot read. Say, by and large there are some very unique conditions that have to come together where you can get some sustainability. But if you don't have all of those things coming together, which is going to require everyone coming together and figuring out what to do in a sensible way, collapse is potentially inevitable. Or of high likelihood. I don't want to scare anybody, but this is what the other research is talking about. One of the shocking things about the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment is that when they look into the future, they have these different scenarios. And they were an ecosystem assessment, so they were trying to look at proactive environmental thinking and management versus reactive. So they were looking at global industrialization, the global economy. They were looking at something called Techno Garden, where you would look at global environmental patterns to try to minimize the stress on systems. Or looking more regionally, this is global, regional. Looking regionally is kind of the garden effect. Could we actually use green infrastructure to sustain the planet? But the one on the top right has always struck me because the cartoon was a really weird one when I saw it 10 years ago. This is way before the current administration, way before any of the stuff we're talking about here. There is a wall that is separating the rich countries, literally, a wall, between the rich countries and the poor countries and it's something called Order from Strength, where there's a regional retrenchment. And the different regions begin to foster their own self-sufficiency, but of course they can't be self-sufficient because modern industrial societies have evolved over the last many decades to rely on global trade. So what happens is they begin to degrade their systems. You could look at some of the economic aspects of this, but Order From Strength scenario doesn't do well on several measures, the worst, on several measures. And this called improvement in ecosystem services, improvements or degradation for Global Orchestration, that was that top left, this is the top right. So no bars that are showing improvements to ecosystems because by drawing a wall around yourself, you've got to rely on your local resources and you cannot do it without overstretching the balance. There's also, since we're toying with this idea, there's this idea of collapse. There's another book you all should be reading, it's a book called Collapse by Jared Diamond and it was maybe about 10 years ago that he published this. He talks a lot about island states, in particular. And he used the island states as a metaphor for what might be happening globally. And the island states are really interesting, because he looks over long history, like archeological records dating back hundreds if not thousands of years. A lot of his work cites one of our faculty members from Brooklyn College, Sophia Perdikaris, who's an archeologist and anthropologist. And she and her colleagues and Jared Diamond looked at many, many examples of how humans outstripped the carrying capacity of their environments on islands. This is before any fossil fuels or any industrialized society. But what it does is it makes some really, really interesting points about how through human hubris, arrogance, warfare, just crazy thinking, they've outstripped the capacity of those island states to support the population. And time and time and time again, you see these collapses. To the point where it's almost a bad habit that we have as a species. And one of the points made in the book is, well, it's maybe not so far of a jump to get to the global scale, given the fact that now we have all sorts of telecommunication, fossil fuels. Our capacity to move beyond the bounds of any small island. And maybe there's some lessons to be learned here. We didn't talk too much about climate change. For those of you who don't know about this, there's plenty of writing on this. I've sort of taken a backseat, in terms of doing my own research on this, it's a pretty crowded field. There are people working on that. This is a nearly million year record of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. But if you notice, there are ups and downs associated with carbon dioxide in the atmosphere generally warmer climates and these declines, cooler climates, lots of glaciation, et cetera. We came out of the last glaciation about 20,000 years ago. And we came into the Industrial Revolution. And guess what we started doing? We started pumping carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. And we're here, at the time this was published, I guess this was three or four years ago, we're just under 400, we're now above 400 parts per million. Way above, way above what we had for nearly a million years prior. And it's probably no accident, you could debate it, I don't debate it. It's based on, basically high-school chemistry. The work of Lavosia and Irenaeus. You have a greenhouse gas, you're pumping it into the atmosphere, something has to happen to the atmosphere. It should be no surprise that since 1880, we're recording record temperatures locally. And the last 10 warmest years, since 1880 have occurred in the last 17 years. And I think 2016 might have been the warmest on record, I'm not quite sure, but it was certainly close to the record. Okay, why is this important, why is this important? All this stuff might be of academic value. But we are the main in an integrated, interconnected world. And there's this other big notion that you should be familiar with called tipping points. And using a climate change as an example, you pump enough carbon dioxide and trap enough of the solar energy coming into the planet, don't, back in the states, all sorts of mischief ranked. You could begin to melt the Greenland or the Antarctic ice sheets. Which would have all of these ripple effects through the system, through the oceans, through the atmosphere. Too many to iterate right now, and I'm getting the cutoff time here. Let me just say that these are non-linear impacts. We are barely able to understand all their dimensions. We recognize they're there, but we don't have a perfect knowledge about what the hell happens if we double the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, we don't know. And therefore we need more research. So at precisely the moment that we need the most research, thank God we have an administration that's putting lots of money into this research. And this kid can sleep at night. We're studying the tipping points, folks. That's sarcastic, no laughter, well. Was that such a dark talk? I'm trying to just scope it out, you can make your own judgment. Final point, I love to show this Saul Stein, cover of the New Yorker. New York has been deemed one of the energy efficient cities. We walk a lot, we take a lot of public transportation, we're packed into small apartments and that's more efficient. But New York City would not survive without the very interconnected Earth system that I'm talking about. Just try to grow enough food for New York City, see how long that would last. Do it on a rooftop garden, see how long you can survive. We'd be at each others' throats, fighting for food. You can't survive unless you look beyond the Hudson. This is really classic notion of a New Yorker's view of the world. And I'm just going to draw the conclusion, I'm trying not to be an advocate, I'm just trying to lay out the logic. At precisely the moment we know the system's interconnected. At precisely the moment we continue our population growing and aspirations for everyone to not be poor. Something might give. And at precisely the moment, we don't know what exactly will give. It's when we we're really going to have to be struggling to argue for basic research, which to my mind, plays into Jared Diamond's notion that people make mistakes over and over and over again, but they know better. And so with that very negative last picture, I end. There's a lot of material that you can find on the website, if you wish to take a look at it. Anyone who wants a tour of the facility, just come see me later, we'll try to organize that. (audience clapping) - Our last speaker is Dr. Jessica Benjamin. Dr. Benjamin is a psychoanalyst and an author of numerous books and articles. Her earlier work involved the reconstruction of psychoanalysis from a feminist perspective. More recently in the last decade, she has spent time working on a project for acknowledgement in the Middle East between Israeli and Palestinian mental health workers and community organizers. Dr. Benjamin's most recent book, Beyond Doer and Done to: Recognition Theory, Intersubjectivity and the Third, will be out in about eight weeks from Routledge Press. - Well, gee, I think we should all just start to drink. (audience laughing) And talk tales, but obviously, some issues needs a good therapist. And I'm not saying that would be me, but I will say that, clearly, there's a lot of insanity behind all of this. And so I see myself as justified in speaking, even after this extremely clear scientific presentation of our dilemma, because now I want to talk about irrational reasons that we are where we are, which is being unable to deal with it as well as we'd like. I did come from a slightly different angle, though. Namely, the angle that I was hoping that some of you who are here are going to devote yourselves to actively resisting the current assault on our democracy, our planet, our lives. And so, it's written from that point of view. Let's start with the idea that our country is now divided and polarized. And from our side's point of view, we are virtually at war. The Civil War, the struggle over abolition of slavery, maybe the last time America was so ridden, though the struggle culminating in the New Deal was fierce. It was not a loss of faith in government, exactly like Atina described, but a fight over who will own government, which we are now seeing once again. In the words of Lincoln, the struggle that is joined between those who view liberty as the right to dispose of the bodies and labor of others, and those who believe in liberty of all to dispose of their own bodies and labor. We might also had planet to bodies. Viewed in the this way, the struggle against slavery and the struggle against the oppression and exploitation of all labor, as well as the right to control our own bodies, could be seen as part of one struggle. Those of us who have been on and off fighting these battles for most of our lives may be surprised to find that while our side not only lost the election, technically, it has never been so unified, so determined and persistently active. Trump has brought this about, it seems, by flagrantly uncovering the hidden violence, greed, grabbiness, rapaciousness of the unholy alliance between capitalist oligarchy and xenophobia, racism and sexism. His more openly lawless behavior finally moved some of our liberal Democratic establishment out of denial to face the truth that the South has been winning the Civil War for nearly the last 50 years. But now that we're facing it, we might need to think about the psychological consequences of engaging in a pitch battle of us versus them. My psychoanalytic take on this involves extrapolating from the opposition between self and other that occurs between individuals, moving into thinking about the oppositions that manifest socially, as us versus them or the other. Such some other oppositions take the form of doer and done to. By which I mean oppositions like perpetrator and victim or power struggles in personal life that be familiar to you. The main lesson we've learned in individual struggles is that this relationship is reversible. In doer-done to relationships, both sides may come to resemble each other. Our struggles can too easily be shaped defensively by those who attack or accuse us. So that we get into a ping pong match, a back and forth of blaming and find ourselves asserting that there really is a right way and a wrong way. What we need to retrieve, to step out of doer-done to relations is the position that I think of as the basic lawful third. In which we recognize not only wrong doing, but the suffering that it causes. Denial of wrong doing is the central point of my talk. And that way, I think we could extend it to what it is being done to the planet right now. But I have to admit that what I had primarily in my mind is a paradigm, was race and class, just because the pronounced way it's playing out right at this moment. The first problem is how to get beyond, or I shouldn't say that, because really, tomorrow's International Women's Day. And I salute everyone here, in the name of all women everywhere. But I admit that, I'm extrapolating from what I see as the basic figure of male-female domination to thinking about the specifics of the economic oligarchy because of the very things that Charles was just talking about. The fatal way in which the seizure of power has affected us. Anyway, the point that I would stress is that when you are in a doer-done to complementary, you don't simply want to reverse it. And even though we might simply want, perhaps, at times to grind the other into the dust, this is not really what our political strategy can be. The Trump gang and the Republicans who are nervously enjoying the power he has given them, like little kids in a candy shop, actually believe that winning is everything and must be achieved at all costs. And that the harm they inflict by winning can be forever be denied and covered over. They think the issue for us is likewise winning and that our side lost. Thus, defining us in their terms. We think in very different terms, I believe. We think in terms of protecting the people, the democracy, the planet. We do not believe that the only world is one of doer and done to, winners and losers, which justifies doing anything to win. But psychologically, we must admit that the belief underlying their position is one that is held by some people all of the time and most people some of the time. It is the political imaginary, the fantasy of only one, or only some, or only one side can live, that underlies the fear and shame currently driving some very hateful behavior, as well as many people's acquiescence and submission to that behavior. The way I see it, the core fantasy only one can live operates in projecting vulnerability based on fear of annihilation. And the belief that we are living in kill or be killed world. For some human beings, Trump or Bannon, this fantasy is the whole of reality. There is no other world. For other people, this is a feeling state that is activated only in moments of threat and fear of annihilation, rather than accepted as an obvious truth. Now in a world where only some, one can, can live, the fundamental division is not only between those who have power and those who are helpless, the dominators and the dominated, but also those whose suffering is recognized and those whose suffering is not. I refer to this as the dignified and the discarded. As a psychoanalyst, I try to understand this process of normalizing a kill or be killed world, in which some are dignified and others discarded. Why does that work for some people? My roots are in the Neo-Marxist critical theory tradition of the Frankfurt School, which integrated the critique of capitalism with psychoanalysis, so the psychological issue that I consider is how domination and exploitation are mystified and normalized. In that sense, the question of what we do now, here in the university or in the broader sphere of those who resist or those who think about it has to do with how we confront that mystification and the way we think about that in terms of the history of our country. Which, as we know, was built on harming, on genocide, on slavery. Although not only on harming, which is something we have to try to bear in mind. The belief that only some can live is also embedded in the material present in the economic system and the idea of the nation. For many people who would reject such behavior in personal relations, this fantasy is projected onto the social realm. Where it's as they see the nation as threatened by the outside world, they may not treat all individuals they meet as threatening. But economically, the idea that some will live well and others barely survive is justified as the only possible social organization. Even though it involves the exploitation and theft of other people's labor. In the narratives of power that at expressed everywhere popular culture, in many of the popular TV shows right now, and billionaires, those who are ruthless and strong enough to exploit others will live. Or they will live more better. And they will control women, who originally were the primary weak ones deserving of control by the strong. Trump embodies this fantasy in its purest form and has exposed its ugliest underside. But we need to recognize that he's not its only representative. That this psychology of only some will live has a strong religious underpinning in Calvinism and Puritan Fundamentalism. Which originally united two contradictory ideas. On the one hand, all humans have a sinful, greedy nature that must be checked and disciplined. But on the other hand, this religion gives permission for ruthlessness for grabbing power in the name of self-preservation because the successful are seen as the ones who are not parasites. And the ones who deserved to be saved. Others will be discarded. Of course, this happens when there are too many workers and capital has no use for them. Now the problem is that that whole world view contradicts our democratic ideology. Which, at least in theory, should see all members as part of a collectivity that, in which all deserve to live. And that democratic idea contradicts this fundamentalist idea that authority is good. That those in power is good. And then to impugn the goodness of those in power, even if they achieve their power by harming, is bad. Now this whole good-bad thing is very complicated. And I really can get lost in it, I have to admit. Shame enters into the picture here. The fear of being among the socially discarded instead of the deserving, those who are left to perish invisibly diminished, obviously leads people to feel anger and helplessness. This has been talked about nonstop since the election. However, what we know is that people accept a large amount of blame for their own helplessness. They think that they have been discarded because of that, they did something wrong. And didn't do enough. And in order to both exploit that fear and reassure them, the Republicans have successfully developed the strategy of saying that they, the forgotten men, are not shameful and weak because that shameful weakness actually belongs to the other, who cheats and takes for them. Blacks, immigrants, women, the liberal elite, who supposedly champion all those weaker groups. Now Trump added some vital new ingredients and took this idea of the war between us and them to a whole new level by removing the shame from a perverse form of winning that crushes losers. And in this way, reassuring the men and sometimes the women who identify with him that they are not the discarded other, not the losers. By flouting law, rules, convention that the enemy elite embraces, he perversely modeled the enjoyment, the pleasure of breaking the law. And of course, I actually think that despite the many differences, it's the psychology of this that is most similar to national socialism. The idealization of the leader who is able to transgress, that kind of thing. And that's part of why everybody's talking about it. Not because there are exact historical resemblances, I think, but because there are very close psychological resemblances. Even though, to some of us it is obvious that the hatred of women's bodies that Trump expressed is based in feelings of weakness and helplessness, and the disgust and depreciation of others whom he calls weak is based on his own hatred of himself. That is apparently not evident to everyone. And we who see in his expression this kind of hatred and impulsive lack of control, and in fact an expression of helplessness, are only on one side of this story. On the other side of this story are people who actually have grown up believing that this how people in power express their strength. By showing that power and showing that only they can live. How are we going to deal with this profound, not just political, but psychological divide and the way that it makes people take a stance toward harming others? To me, this is a really difficult political question. I'll just go on with a few more ideas I have about that. The ordinary people, men and women who identify with Trump's violations and consciously believe he's flouting the elite, not pillaging the people, at the same time unconsciously identify with his grabbing and winning and defying the law as only a rich person, a privileged person, indeed a king, could do. And this makes him their hero. The ability to appeal to this contradiction, which I do think is typical of fascism, is his secret. The solution to the contradiction of people feeling or being the underdog, and yet identifying with the top dog, includes making people feel that they are deserving victims. In other words, that they are being victimized by the elite who try to shame them. While at the same time, they are allowed to see themselves as deserving rather than shamed, because they are like the top dog. Who's now going to redeem them and trash the elite. In addition, all those elements of being discarded are going to be put into the other, the excluded, the one who is now being walled or out or banned. I guess when I was thinking about it, I tried to imagine what is a good way politically to approach this story. And I think of it in terms of harming. And the way in which harming is accepted and is the way of showing power in our society. Again, it's not the only way. We just had a president who showed dignity in power by the opposite in many ways. But it's a very strong current. Associating manliness with aggressive power. Associating white purity with subjugating people of color. Now all this harming, I believe, has been covered over by the ideology of American goodness. In a sense, the very fact of our democracy has been used as way to deny this other side. The dark side of America. This is really hearts of gentle and high country. How do we confront that history? What do we do about that history? One of the things I'd like to see us not do, and learn from the past of political movements, is to be divided and to have those who are oppressed be divided rather than united. This usually happens when people struggle over the moral capital of suffering. That is when victims feel that they have to be recognized at the expense of some other victim being recognized. Which again, brings us back to this problem of only one can live. Whenever you're in this oppositional polarity, you can start to suspect that this fantasy is at work and that this is what needs to be deconstructed. We need to get off that seesaw. Because even though, of course there are scarce resources, and we've now seen the planet's going to run out, there's isn't necessarily a scarce resource when it comes to recognition. We don't actually have a limited amount of compassion and recognition. What we have is the belief that only some can have compassion and recognition. There's not actually a limited amount. For people who feel ashamed of their needs and at fault for failing, of course it's especially hard to admit that others have been victimized through their actions and through their fault. Because if they were at fault, then they would be bad. If they had allowed others to be harmed, they would deserve punishment. And now they would deserve to be on the bottom. And now they would deserve this reversal. Now it actually would be true that the others were victimized to get the better of them. So they're kind of in a bind, which we have to help them out of. Not that I'm sure we can do that. My experience, clinically, is mixed, so-so. Sometimes you get people out of that, sometimes they fall back in. But the point is I see it in this way. That we need to deactivate this fantasy, even as someone like Trump is activating it and stimulating the fears around this fantasy that only some can have. We need to keep emphasizing the fact that in many ways, there is enough for everyone. There is enough respect for everyone's suffering, to go around. There is enough dignity for everyone. What stands in the way of that is a really perverse ideology that we've seen, for instance in the response to Black Lives Matter, where a kind of competition is, a twisted competition has developed. And it appears as if those who want their rights are trying to turn the tables and blacks will do that at the expense of whites. Turning resistance to oppression and harming, into political correctness has been one of the most powerful strategies of the right. I believe that this reversal of doer and done to, which is a very powerful psychological structure, can be, to some degree, overcome. That we can counter the fear that only those who win the victims' sweepstakes get helped and that others are discarded. One way that won't happen is if we assign all goodness to ourselves and all badness to the bad people. So basically, I think I'll just sum this up by saying that I see one of the main obstacles to dealing with this problem as having been solved by the terrible crisis we had gone through. And that is that the issue of harming is no longer covered over and the liberal ideology that America is basically good, we don't have to face to up to this, I think has been, in a sense, exploded. We can now have a very different idea of where goodness lies. Goodness is not in the view of the resistance, located in the strength and power to control others. But rather, in the voicing of demands for respect and for mutual understanding and support by people of very different backgrounds, who share a recognition of vulnerability. And the recognition of vulnerability, which dignifies all kinds of suffering that we've had. That recognition of vulnerability, along with the need that we have to make certain kinds of economic demands on behalf of the large numbers of people is different than these constant pronouncements that America is good. In fact, it's the opposite, in my view. I think we have to understand that it is possible, even in America, to talk about something that has occurred in the last decades in particular and that is that we have a whole party devoted maliciously to supporting oligarchy and suppressing democracy. Again, it's a very different situation. But think about the analogies with what Atina said. In the sense that conservative, centric people were willing to go along with a great deal as long as they could protect themselves. Now I want to find a way to think about, at least, how we can take advantage of this moment where it has become obvious to many people in the liberal establishment that this is not working and this has not worked for them. And that the oligarchic party is not going to be defeated by them talking about how good we are. We are going to have to be nasty women. We are going to have to talk about the harm that economic exploitation does. It's striking to me that the liberal elite and media, as I see it, people in the Democratic party, tried to shame Bernie. That is to say put him in position of weakness and that he, and so this is like regardless of what you think about all his political proposals, right. He refused to be shamed. He actually said, no, I'm going to tell you that I believe we could do all of this for everyone and it's not shameful and it's not stupid. And so he changed the idea of what it meant to be strong. In a very powerful way, for a large number of people. Being strong no longer meant expressing yourself in a way that you protect yourself from being ridiculed by a large portion of the media. Now of course it helped that Trump didn't mind being ridiculed, either. But I don't think that's primarily why Bernie did it. I think that what Bernie represented was a statement that really everyone can live. Really there is enough. As my last point, I want to say that in order to protest against the unchecked harming of the wealthy class that is trying to consolidate more and more power in this historical moment, I think it's absolutely necessary to consider the way in which harming has been accepted in our societies, and socially, psychologically accepted. And that's why in particular I'm emphasizing the history of racism and slavery, because I think it's a critical moment for us to talk about what hasn't happened in our country and that is there hasn't been an end to the Civil War that involved national reconciliation. And a truthful confrontation with what happened here. And by contrast, with Germany, there's been less national discussion of how as nation, as a country, we really are obligated still to repair that wrong. That it's still being carried from generation to generation. I see this as a moment when a form of acknowledge and a form of unifying ourselves to make repair on our side could be among, for those people who are so frightened by the way they have been implicated in racism, that they cannot, my sense of it, they cannot actually unite to oppose their own class oppression because they have been so complicit in racial hatred, xenophobia and so forth. So I actually think helping people to become extricated from this history of harming is a kind of liberation that could have a certain positive effect in terms of people also being able to fight for economic democracy. And I think that understanding the way in which most people, as I said, not all people, most people really want to get out of this kill or be killed world. Most people would like to feel that they could repair, in some way, what has gone wrong so that they don't have to live with this level of shame and guilt. Or many people feel that way. And I see this as a national opportunity to bring that into our political discussion in a real and vital way. So that's kind of my message for what I guess a psychoanalyst see about the current moment. I'd be happy to talk with anybody about it. (audience clapping) I'm sorry, what? - [Audience Member] You had mentioned Donald Trump when you mentioned double standards. But would is your voice or view point with the situation with Hillary Clinton? (mumbles) So what happened here? - Well, I'm less to talk about her winning and losing, but I had a whole section, but I was really trying not to take up too much time here. I think that Hillary Clinton was caught in a really interesting bind. On the one hand, she absolutely believes that America is good and she saw herself as part of the good people and also part of the good powerful people who were entitled to rule. Who were entitled to have this power. Which she thought she would use for the good. And I'm not against that, because I think almost anybody that does anything useful is going to have some of that belief. But on the other hand, he really sacrificed her own awareness of the way in which the attacks on her, that started already in the 1990s, signaled a much more irrational force that was at work. This irrational, hatred force that she really didn't know how to speak to and address. Which the liberal establishment, in a sense, doesn't know how to speak to and address. Right-wing people know how to mobilize hate. Liberal people don't know how to talk about hate. And that's our dilemma and that's, I guess, the simplest way to say what my message is right now. So I think her not being able to address that hate head on and having to bury herself in all the details of how emails she had instead of really talking about what it meant that she was being attacked in this way, it's a very interesting thing. Because I literally have this crazy person who's now rampaging in the White House who would have found a way to talk about people doing that to him that would have been much more emotionally direct. It would have been paranoid, but it would have been direct. So that's, I think, part of our dilemma, is dealing with hate. But hate as it is associated with actually harming people. Everybody feels hatred, that's not really the point. It has to do with harming people. Taking the hate out of yourself and putting it out there in a way that's destructive. Yeah? - [Mikhail] Is there anybody else? To go from where you ended the talk about extricating people from their guilt and how to do that, because I think, we on the left, have had faith that we are doing that. So that the left could be viewed, whether it's political correctness or certain ways that we ask people, kind of a mass group, that's a completely different way and it backfired, right? So the question is really how do we go about that in a more productive way? Even in the classrooms, even in the university? - Well, part of what I was trying to get at, very briefly was that I think that as long as there's competition over whose victimhood is going to be recognized, it's very hard to extricate yourself from a position in which what you say will appear to be defending or championing one group over another group. It seems to me that, especially politics of non-violence has to be really very clear that all suffering matters. And that all harming matters. So when people have been harmed by the economic system then turn around and are hateful and harm others, you can't be saying the harm that was done to them doesn't matter because now they're harming, themselves. No, you have to be aware of those contradictions and I think that there are many other psychological aspects to the way in which people find it difficult to recognize the psychological meaning of pumping badness into your image of the other. And inflating their badness in order to create your goodness. That is not the same a politics of recognition, where you really respect everyone's suffering. So getting that down is something that some people just do intuitively and just do really well. But it's something, especially on campuses, it needs to be very self-consciously reflected on. And that is how can we recognize and respect people who have been victimized or traumatized or harmed without turning that into a kind of moral capital of suffering which gives them a right to, in certain ways, condemn other people. Yeah. - Thanks, I really enjoyed both of you. I have about five questions. - A direct one to tell us (laughs). - There was a really clear opposition in your talk, between on the one hand, how society is not enough. We all to be one. And then you're saying on the contrary, at least this psychological anxiety, there's enough of that for everybody, there's enough recognition, there's enough, what was it, empathy, to go around. - And maybe enough to go around so that we could think together about what to do about to do about the problem that Charles is bringing up, because we keep making especially bad decisions based on the fact that we don't think together. So if we don't create more forms of socially cohesive positive supportive thinking together experiences, we will not deal with these things even remotely wisely. People who know very well that the environment is a problem don't let themselves think about it. Or they vote against their environmental interests, because they are feeling personally beleaguered in certain ways and their self-esteem is under attack. And when you're self-esteem is under attack and when they don't have any vision of uniting with other people to fix this, those two things are very importantly, on one or the other end of the seesaw. You can attack people's self-esteem or you can give them more communal organizations that empower them. So I think there are actually there are ways that you can blend these two perspectives together. Which doesn't mean in the end, we're going to save everyone from death. But it does mean that we're going to take responsibility for doing our best, it's very different. - [Audience Member] So that's my question, before I asked it. - (laughs) Sorry. - Which is great. Can I ask another one? Well, have them come back to me, because there's other ones. - Okay, my question was along the same lines as Professor Dekel's, which is, I think there's a large portion of, they're not entirely white, mostly young white men, who've been radicalized into this kind of Alt-Right line of thinking. Can they even still receive those messages? Or can they be can be reintegrated back into a polite society? I don't know if that's a statement that answers the question, to be honest. - Well, I think that what our goal, politically, if we're organizing resistance is not to immediately go for the most hard-core opponents and try to win them over. I think what we are trying to do, in some way, is to distinguish ourselves from them in a way that allows many people who are confused to feel that our side is the more hopeful, the more embracing side in which their own identity can still be preserved. So that would be my first thought. And then I think that what happens to that smaller group of people, when our majority is really well-integrated is less dire for us. I also think, though, if we're thinking about the next generation of college freshman who are coming in, young men. I do think that an interesting question was raised by a psychologist in New Mexico pretty recently related to this, which is, what happens to young men when they feel as though they're being told that they can only have a perpetrator identity. It's very important to offer people something besides a perpetrator identity. And not having them feel like innately men have to have a perpetrator identity. - [Audience Member] I'm sorry, what's that? What's the perpetrator identity? - Oh, that all men are sexual predators and aggressors and they're being seen in that way. In other words, it's like if you go to these group college meetings where the kids ask questions about what college they should go to in their senior year in high school. And like repeatedly, the question just keeps coming up, well, is this campus safe? Is this campus sexually safe? How does that feel to a young man who thinks that he might be going to college to have some fun? It means that he's being told already that his desires are probably going to hurt somebody else. So we have too much language of harming in certain areas. And not enough realization that people are more complex than that. - Yep? - Do you believe that the psychoanalyst's job in our current globalized economy is really to demystify the concept of nationalism? Because for one to feel the predication of victimhood versus victimized, in a global sense, we're now dealing with one macro concept. Would it not have to be within the relations to nations as your book about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is just one example of. For it is the reason that, as you said, is this fictitious concept, this illusionary concealment of real larger issues. Which do not say that for the psychoanalyst, the job is to demystify nationalism so that all the components of victimhood and victimized essentially collapse within themselves? - Yeah, that's a good way to put it. Although I'm not sure nationalism is the, the term nationalism has so many different meanings. I'm particularly concerned with the idea that you have to see all good as being your own side. And project badness into the other. But there are many other ways in which our nation versus them gets calibrated. I can't go into all that right now, but it's a good start. The thing is that I wasn't actually speaking from the point of view of nations that much right at this moment. I was thinking more in terms of our nationalism and the anti-globalism as being more of a mythic and fantastical construction in many ways because, not to say that globalism hasn't had an economic effect. But that this sort of mythology of these other countries who are taking away our jobs and these immigrants who are coming in and taking away our jobs. All of these are acquiring a mythic status. And so the myth of the nation as being some us, whoever that us is, and the them as being the invaders and the destroyers seems to me to be something that is working for people to manifest some other kind of fear. Because as we know, the immigrants aren't even in the places where people are most afraid of them. So really, what is that fear? We need to understand that fear. I think it's coming much more from the punitive authoritarian structures that people are raised in that are constantly shaming them, on the one side. And the rack lack of economic opportunity for them to overcome that sense of worthlessness on the other. I think other people want to have a chance to. - [Audience Member] I noticed that your talk and the professor whose last name I could take an hour to try to. - Charlie V., Charlie V. - Pronounce correctly. His talk is based on statistics, but his statistics are a reflection of what you were saying in counterpoint. He's talking about the zero sum game, and so are you. - Yeah, but he's not just talking about a zero sum game, because if I understand correctly, this is something we cannot solve in a zero sum way. - [Audience Member] I'm not suggesting that. I'm suggesting only that there are ways around a zero sum game. But it is a very difficult obstacle. And essentially it just keeps getting worse. Because you said the Civil War is winning, the South is winning the Civil War. And I very much agree with that. I believe that the stain of slavery has never been confronted in this country. That that would be the biggest first step that we could make in terms of recognition. Because America is recognized for better or for worse as a global leader. And yet, despite the statistics that indicate we should join together in larger tide, and despite the side from which you approach it, it seems almost, it seems a very daunting task. And I don't know how better to talk about it. - If I might just say, some of the curves that I was showing, I think, shooting up and overriding the capacity of the planet to sustain these trends. Some of the proponents of those very pieces of science recognize that this is not going to be about more resource use and increasing the caloric content of diets and more meat, that's not the issue. The issue is one of governance. And so we actually are joined at the hip, we didn't really recognize it, but without that basic mentality change, the curves will continue to go up. And that was the whole point of this book by Jared Diamond about collapse. It was human behavior that destroyed the system and the humans knew better. But despite that knowledge, they overran the systems. - Okay, so what I'm also trying to add that is the override takes place because there seems to be almost innately in us a part of ourselves that really believes that we can only live at the expense of others. And people who are especially wedded to that proposition run multinational corporations, run economic institutions that make these kinds of decisions. In other words, they tend to be more thinking about how they can survive, not how all can survive. And they don't have the mentality of how can we all live? Not true for all of them, but for many, many of them. And because partly, because this is how you rise in capitalist ruling, this is how the capitalist world is organized, by exploiting others' labor. So this is a mentality you get. So changing that mentality really has to come, I think, from a mass movement of people outside those boardrooms. And I really believe that we could create that mentality. I don't have a recipe for that, I was just saying in terms of my own experience, one way to do that is for us to be clearer about the fact that we can face harm and we don't have to just crumble up in shame and die because we know we've been part of the harming and we've been in complicit and that then weakens us unbelievably. We need to have the strength to face it so that we can actually get together and do something about all the problems. That's sort of the simple version of that. thesis for mba management CUNY School of Law (at Queens College).